A Social Networks Theory of Privacy by Strahilevitz, Lior
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2005
A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
Lior Strahilevitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lior Strahilevitz, "A Social Networks Theory of Privacy," 72 University of Chicago Law Review 919 (2005).
A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
Lior Jacob Strahilevitzt
What facts are public and what facts are private? It is the fundamental, first-principles ques-
tion in privacy law, and a necessary element in the two most important privacy torts public disclo-
sure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion. This paper argues that insights from the litera-
ture on social networks and information dissemination can help provide courts with a coherent
and consistent methodology for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a particular fact that he has shared with one or more persons. The social networks litera-
ture has generated theoretical and empirical insights about the probability that information dis-
closed to one member of a community will ultimately become known by a large segment of the
community. Using these insights, courts can gauge whether the plaintiff's previously private infor-
mation would have been widely disseminated regardless of the defendant's actions in a particular
case. If so, the information in question was public, and if not, the tort law ought to deem the infor-
mation private. This Article argues that such an approach, which treats the privacy question as an
empirical one, is more attractive than any other method of establishing whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information at issue.
Imagine your deepest, darkest secret-a true, but deeply embar-
rassing, fact about yourself. Now suppose that you awake one morning
to find this secret suddenly revealed to everyone you know, as well as
dozens of strangers. Most of us would regard such a turn of events as a
personal catastrophe. Given the unappealing nature of this scenario,
and the ease with which juicy secrets can spread among people, one
might expect that we would play our cards close to our vests, refusing
to reveal these embarrassing details to anyone. Yet it is likely that
most of us have shared our most embarrassing details with other peo-
ple: spouses, siblings, parents, best friends, clergy, psychiatrists, co-
workers, or perhaps even strangers on transatlantic flights. Indeed,
millions of Americans have shared their most intimate personal de-
tails with dozens of strangers, for example, by participating in a
twelve-step group or seeking advice in an online chat room. By com-
mon parlance, we still consider these facts to be "secrets" even after
we have revealed them to a handful of people.
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But do they remain secrets for the purposes of U.S. privacy law,
such that a plaintiff can recover in tort against someone who discovers
them through improper means or publishes them in a newspaper with-
out her consent? If so, at what point does a fact "cross over" from be-
ing a "private matter" to a "public matter" whose widespread disclo-
sure does not provide the plaintiff with a cause of action? Can some-
thing still be "private" if two people know about it? Five people? A
hundred people? When John Kerry and John Edwards were criticized
after the recent presidential and vice-presidential debates for violating
Mary Cheney's "privacy" by mentioning her sexual orientation-an
orientation that thousands of Americans already knew about--were
the critics making a coherent claim?' Where, in short, is the legal
boundary between public and private?
This is the fundamental, first-principles question in privacy law,
and a necessary element in the two most important privacy torts, pub-
lic disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion. Although I
will focus on the privacy torts in this paper, the question about what
information is deemed "private" or "secret" cuts across many areas of
American law, including the Fourth Amendment, trade secrets, pat-
ents, evidence, the constitutional right of information privacy, and the
Freedom of Information Act
Despite the centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a
coherent, consistent methodology for determining whether an indi-
1 The law's answer to the Mary Cheney question is "no." Press accounts had mentioned
her sexual orientation long before the debates. See, for example, Susan Greene, Gays: Cheney's
Views an Issue: Daughter's Orientation Seen as "Dichotomy," Denver Post A14 (July 27, 2000).
Once a fact has been reported in the press, courts hold that it is no longer private, and third
parties can disseminate the fact with immunity. See, for example, Sipple v Chronicle Publishing
Co, 154 Cal App 3d 1040,201 Cal Rptr 665,669-70 (1984). Nevertheless, an influential columnist
invoked Cheney's privacy as a basis for criticizing Kerry and Edwards. See William Safire, The
Lowest Blow; The Kerry Campaign Believes Cheney's Daughter Is "Fair Game," Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette A17 (Oct 19, 2004), noting that prior to Senator Edwards' mention of Mary Cheney's
sexual orientation,
only political junkies knew that a member of the Cheney family serving on the campaign
staff was homosexual. The vice president, to show it was no secret or anything his family
was ashamed of, had referred to it briefly twice this year, but the news media-respecting
family privacy-had properly not made it a big deal. The percentage of voters aware of
Mary Cheney's sexual orientation was tiny.
2 The public disclosure of private facts tort requires the plaintiff to show that the defen-
dant (a) gave publicity, (b) to a private fact, (c) that is not of legitimate concern to the public,
where such disclosure (d) is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D (1977).
The tort for intrusion upon seclusion requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant (a) in-
tentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, (b) on the solitude or seclusion of another or on his
private affairs or concerns, (c) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id § 652B.
3 See notes 245-50.
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vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular fact that
has been shared with one or more persons. Indeed, jurisdictions can-
not agree on a framework for resolving these kinds of cases. Hence,
Georgia law holds that disclosing sensitive information to dozens of
people, and perhaps even tens of thousands of strangers, does not nec-
essarily render information "public" for the purposes of the public
disclosure of private facts tort, but Ohio law governing the same tort
holds that a plaintiff's decision to share sensitive information with
four coworkers eviscerates her expectation of privacy in that informa-
tion.'
This Article argues that insights from the emerging literature on
information transmission through social networks can help courts de-
velop a more rigorous and objective notion of "privacy" for the pur-
poses of the privacy torts. It argues that privacy tort law should not
focus on the abstract, circular, and highly indeterminate question of
whether a plaintiff reasonably expected that information about him-
self would remain "private" after he shared it with one or more per-
sons. Instead, the law should focus on the more objective and satisfy-
ing question of what extent of dissemination the plaintiff should have
expected to follow his disclosure of that information to others. The
goal here is to solidify the "privacy" inquiry as an empirical question,
rather than a highly contested normative matter. Most courts appear
to be treating the question as an empirical one presently, but they are
tackling the empirical issue in a casual, careless, and confused manner.
The literature that I introduce herein explores the ways that in-
formation flows through society. Studying rumor transmission has long
been a subject of some interest among sociologists and economists,
and a few more recent studies have focused on the dissemination of
information about HIV status and other sensitive forms of personal
information through an individual's social circle. Taken as a whole, this
literature provides an informative, albeit incomplete, picture of how
likely particular information is to spread through any given social
network. I will review this literature, discuss some of its implications
for privacy law, and then compare these implications to the analysis
4 See Multimedia WMAZ, Inc v Kubach, 212 Ga App 707,443 SE2d 491,494 (1994) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs disclosure that he was suffering from AIDS to approximately sixty indi-
viduals-family members, friends, medical personnel, and fellow support group members-did
not make the fact of his disease public as a matter of law). See also Zieve v Hairston, 266 Ga App
753, 598 SE2d 25, 30 (2004) (holding that the plaintiff did not waive his right to privacy in his
status as a hair transplant recipient even after he agreed to allow photographs of his successful
transplant surgery to be shown in television advertisements aired 500 miles outside of his home
state).
5 See Fisher v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 61 Ohio Misc 2d 303,
578 NE2d 901,903 (Ohio Ct Cl 1988).
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that courts have conducted in privacy tort cases. I will argue that social
networks analysis is an indispensable tool for resolving disputes where
the parties to a communication disagree about whether the recipient
was entitled to share it with others.
This framework has significant implications for privacy law. In
order to determine whether a particular fact known by some people
will become widely publicized, one needs to know much more than
how many people are currently aware of the fact. Rather, one needs to
know where, within a social network, this information exists; what
types of people have access to it; what the incentives are for subse-
quent dissemination; whether the information must be aggregated
with other forms of information in order to become pertinent; and
what kinds of social norms facilitate or constrain subsequent dissemi-
nation of the information. Information known by one hundred people
might never be disseminated further, but the widespread dissemina-
tion of other information known to only two people might be inevita-
ble. The literature on social networks allows us to identify useful gen-
eralizations about the ways in which information flows through soci-
ety. Because information spreads in rather predictable ways, and pat-
terns emerge in particular kinds of networks, courts can use these
regularities to analyze the ex ante likelihood that previously private
information will become widely known. Once courts understand how
to do that, it becomes relatively simple for them to evaluate whether a
particular fact about a plaintiff eventually would have become public
if the defendant had not intervened. This is precisely the inquiry that
privacy tort law demands.
Part I briefly explores the theoretical underpinnings of privacy
tort law protection and establishes a framework for the discussion that
follows. Part II describes the common law's treatment of the question
of when information that has been disclosed to one or more people
might remain private for the purposes of these torts. Part III delves
into the literature on social networks analysis. It pays particularly
close attention to the ways in which network structure and cultural
variables can affect the probability that information disclosed to a few
people will ultimately become known by the larger community. Part
IV uses the insights from this literature to evaluate the accuracy of
judicial efforts to assess whether litigants should have expected that
information disclosed to a group of people eventually would be dis-
seminated much more widely. As a general matter, courts do a rea-
sonably good job of making these assessments, but there are a few
areas in which their intuitions lead them astray. The Article suggests
that using insights from social networks theory can help courts evalu-
ate privacy in a more accurate and transparent manner.
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I. WHY PROTECT PRIVACY?
The types of privacy issues that this Article seeks to resolve are
those involving a plaintiffs disclosure of information about himself to
a limited number of people. Under one notion of information privacy,
information ceases to be private the moment it is shared with a second
person. Yet, as the Supreme Court has recognized, such an unsophisti-
cated conception of "privacy" is much too cramped for a society of
6
social beings. No one's closet is devoid of skeletons. When asked to
imagine the most private facts about ourselves, we will typically think
of sexual encounters and bodily functions, sensitive medical informa-
tion, shameful past misdeeds, unfavorable opinions about peers, and
knowledge of our fundamental weaknesses and fears. As I suggested
at the outset, most of us would regard the disclosure of these details to
our entire circle of acquaintances, let alone the public at large, as a
personal disaster.
At the same time, no one among us has guarded that embarrass-
ing information with maximum diligence. Certain presumptively "pri-
vate" acts, such as sexual intercourse, necessarily take place in the
presence of at least one other person. Other facts might be created in
solitude, but remain, by common parlance, "private" even when shared
to some extent. We all tell some people about our medical ailments.
Virtually everyone feels the need to unburden himself by confessing
embarrassing acts to another. Indeed, sharing our most intimate in-
formation with those who we expect to keep it secret promotes fur-
ther friendship and intimacy.7 We tend to like people who confide in
6 United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489
US 749,763-64,770 (1989) (internal citations omitted):
[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individ-
ual's control of information concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the
protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemi-
nation of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it
private. According to Webster's initial definition, information may be classified as "private"
if it is "intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of per-
sons: not freely available to the public."
In sum, the fact that "an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean that an individual has
no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information."
7 See Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice 142
(Harvard 1970):
To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each other. Intimacy
is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not
share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring this
right, privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.
2005]
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us, even if we have only met them recently.8 One respected privacy
theorist has gone so far as to suggest that "intimate relationships sim-
ply could not exist if we did not continue to insist on privacy for
them."9 It should not be necessary to highlight the importance of inti-
macy in human society. Indeed, describing the benefits of intimacy in
economic terms, by referring to its enormous positive externalities, in
some ways understates its importance. A man or woman without inti-
mates is a shell of a person.
For the individual, sharing information about herself can be help-
ful even when intimacy is not involved. Although concerns about inti-
macy provide the strongest justifications for protecting privacy, there
are other reasons why society might value privacy as well.0 Millions of
Americans participate in twelve-step programs and support groups,
where it has become completely normal to disclose to a score of
strangers one's status as an alcoholic, bulimic, child abuse victim, her-
8 See Thomas E. Runge and Richard L. Archer, Reactions to the Disclosure of Public and
Private Self-Information, 44 Soc Psychology Q 357, 361 (1981) (discussing experimental findings
in which subjects claim to like their stranger-partner more if the stranger-partner shares informa-
tion that she claims she has not previously revealed). See also Allan J. Kimmel, Rumors and
Rumor Control: A Manager's Guide to Understanding and Combatting Rumors 111 (Lawrence
Erlbaum 2004); Diego Gambetta, Godfather's Gossip, 35 Archives E.aroprennes de Sociologie
199, 216 (1994) ("[G]ossip leads to more trust and trust leads to more gossip."); Mie Kito, Self-
Disclosure in Romantic Relationships and Friendships Among American and Japanese College
Students, 145 J Soc Psychology 127, 128-29 (2005) (surveying the literature that shows a close
connection between self-disclosure of personal information and relationship quality); Laurel
Richardson, Secrecy and Status: The Social Construction of Forbidden Relationships, 53 Am
Sociological Rev 209, 213 (1988) (arguing that disclosure of pertinent information promotes
friendship and intimacy).
9 Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed, Philoso-
phical Dimensions of Privacy:An Anthology 265,265 (Cambridge 1984). See also Carl D. Schnei-
der, Shame, Exposure, and Privacy 42 (Beacon 1977) ("[In the area of personal relationships,
such as family, friends, and lovers where quality is important, privacy is an operative principle.
These relationships can't be sustained with everyone. To function, they depend on an excluding
condition. Privacy creates the moral capital that is spent in friendship and intimate relations.");
Charles Fried, Privacy [A Moral Analysis], in Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Pri-
vacy 203, 209 ("In general it is my thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship and
trust are only possible if persons enjoy and accord to each other a certain measure of privacy.").
As an empirical matter, intimacy does exist in societies that provide little or no legal protections
for private information. That said, we should not be legal centralists when evaluating Gerstein
and Fried's claims. This Article essentially equates legal privacy protections with de facto privacy
protections that arise via resource constraints on surveillance and impediments to information
dissemination. It may well be that in a hypothetical super-Orwellian world of complete surveil-
lance and instantaneous information dissemination, there would be no intimacy among human
beings.
10 For an exploration of the competing values furthered by privacy law, see Daniel J. So-
love, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal L Rev 1087, 1099-1153 (2002) (suggesting conceptions of
privacy that include the right to be let alone; limited access to the self; secrecy; control over
personal information; personhood; antitotalitariansm; intimacy; and individuality, dignity, and
autonomy).
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oin addict, AIDS sufferer, or gambler." Sharing information within
these groups can bring the discloser helpful advice, as well as the
sometimes substantial psychological relief associated with revealing
certain secrets to people the discloser expects to never encounter
again. 2 We are, in short, constantly disclosing embarrassing informa-
tion about ourselves to third parties, yet we often harbor strong sub-
jective expectations of privacy when doing so. By creating causes of
action for invasion of privacy, most jurisdictions have determined that
the benefits associated with fostering this intimacy justify the costs of
constraining communication. In this paper, I assume the correctness of
that judgment, notwithstanding the criticisms that have been lodged
against privacy tort liability.3
A. Norms and Law
In the vast majority of these situations, the law does not matter
much to people who disclose private information about themselves.
When we disclose sensitive information to friends, the law generally
has little effect on our expectations that these friends will keep the
information secret. Rather, we are relying on our friends' good will, an
explicit promise of confidentiality, or perhaps on an implicit threat of
retribution if the information is disclosed. Where confidentiality is
breached, we might retaliate by refusing to share information with
that person in the future, cutting off friendship ties, or disclosing to
third parties sensitive information that the loudmouth previously
shared with us. A different dynamic arises when we disclose informa-
tion to strangers. Here, we are relying on obscurity-our own anonym-
11 See Jaimie Wilson, United by Addiction--and Hope, Fla Times-Union Cl (Mar 20,2001)
(noting that Alcoholics Anonymous alone has 1.16 million members in the U.S.). See also James
Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 290,
295 (cited in note 9):
Resistance to ... group therapy is overcome when the patients begin to think of each other
not as strangers but as fellow members of the group. The definition of a kind of relation be-
tween them makes possible frank and intimate conversation which would have been totally
out of place when they were merely strangers.
For a discussion of the importance of twelve-step support groups in American society and an
argument for extending an evidentiary privilege to communications among participants, see
Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential Communications
Among Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 St John's L Rev 693,724-51 (1996).
12 See Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 31-32 (Atheneum 1967) (asserting that ano-
nymity allows the discloser to express himself freely and possibly receive an objective response,
without fearing that the stranger is able to exert authority or restraint over him).
13 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga L Rev 393, 409-21
(1978) (offering an economic critique); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan
L Rev 1049, 1122 (2000) (offering a constitutional critique).
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ity or the removal of the stranger from our ordinary social circle-to
protect the confidentiality of the information. In both settings, how-
ever, tort law probably does little to shape people's actual expecta-
tions of privacy.
There is, however, a category of sensitive information disclosure
that is harmful enough to warrant the imposition of legal liability.
These instances generally involve cases of substantial damage to the
plaintiff and very widespread publicity." They also tend to involve
non-repeat-player relationships between the litigants, perhaps charac-
terized by substantial power disparities, such that reputational sanc-
tions often will not deter the conduct in question, and the plaintiff has
no effective way of engaging in self-help. Indeed, the typical invasion
of privacy case involves a media defendant.'5 Unlike the people who
disclose information about themselves to each other, these would-be
defendants are paying close attention to the law.
It is through the regulation of these legally sophisticated parties
that tort law may have a strong, albeit indirect, effect on ordinary
people's expectations of privacy. Ordinary people will expect little
privacy in a world where sensitive information about private figures
that does not appear to have been extracted and disseminated with
the subjects' consent regularly appears on television and in newspa-
pers. Because people understand that there is often an intermediate
actor between the subject of the report and the reporter, they will be-
come more reluctant to share information about themselves as infor-
mation about others, similarly situated, appears with increasing regu-
larity in the mass media." The more ordinary love letters wind up in
The New York Times, the more guarded private figures composing
such letters will become in writing and sending them. All of this poses
a real threat to human intimacy, especially for people who overreact
14 As a general matter, filing a lawsuit for public disclosure of private facts either intro-
duces those facts into the public record or draws substantial press and public attention to those
facts. For a plaintiff who wishes to suppress private information that another person has discov-
ered, filing suit is often a very poor strategy. We can therefore expect that invasion of privacy
disputes will be filed when the plaintiff has little left to lose from further publicity.
15 Obviously, deep pockets provide a partial explanation for this as well. In some of these
cases, there will be an intermediate discloser who is not a party to the suit-for example, a friend
who has blabbed to a reporter.
16 The relationship I am describing, of course, is nonlinear. There may be a tipping point at
which sensitive information about individuals becomes so widely disseminated in the media that
any stigma attached to the disclosure will wither. This is arguably what has begun to happen in
recent years with respect to the disclosure of information about individuals' homosexuality. In
such circumstances, we might expect more disclosure of such information within social circles. By
the same token, however, as the stigma is diminished, we can expect that the disclosure of the
destigmatized information will generate less intimacy between the discloser and disclosee and
fewer psychological benefits for the discloser.
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to very low probability, but high visibility, reputational harms." A soci-
ety interested in fostering intimacy should help people disregard these
very low probability events.
Tort law can thus function as a form of social insurance: protect-
ing those people who engaged in socially desirable sharing of personal
information, but who had the misfortune to see those personal details
disseminated to the general public without their consent. '8 Where a
large group of similarly situated people share information about
themselves, but the news media publicizes only a small percentage of
that information, it can be efficient and just for disseminators to com-
pensate the unlucky few.
B. The Goals of the Law
Tort liability for public disclosure of private facts attempts to
strike a difficult balance by regulating interpersonal communication in
a manner that enhances social welfare. On one hand, the law seeks to
encourage the expressive and psychological benefits that people de-
rive from disclosing sensitive information about themselves to others.
It fosters the kinds of disclosures that lead to intimate relationships,
often benefiting both parties to a sensitive communication.
On the other hand, the law seeks to regulate the further dissemi-
nation of this information. My subsequent dissemination of secrets
that someone has confided in me can be beneficial. Most importantly,
it promotes the development of a relationship between me and the
person with whom I am sharing the information.'9 Note, however, that
sharing private information about someone else seems unlikely to
foster as much intimacy as sharing private information about one's
self.°
17 For a provocative exploration of the idea that the government may have to restrict
certain forms of individual liberty in order to prevent societal expectations of privacy from being
undermined, see Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723,755-57 (1999).
18 For a related argument, see Shubha Ghosh and Vikram Mangalmurti, A Social Insurance
Perspective on Security and Privacy (unpublished working paper July 2004), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=569643 (visited May 16, 2005) (asserting that a theory of
liability for information security breaches caused by software should be based on a social insur-
ance approach, rather than on private rights, because it underscores regulation's role in establish-
ing the social foundation of trust necessary for cyberspace transactions).
19 See notes 7-8.
20 Simply put, trusting someone with one's own secrets makes one vulnerable in a way that
sharing someone else's secrets does not. This vulnerability is an ingredient of intimacy. The rela-
tionship between gossip and trust is less susceptible to categorical characterizations. See Gam-
betta, 35 Archives Europ6ennes de Sociologie at 216 (cited in note 8):
If I confide my secrets to you this may encourage you to trust me and, in turn, to confide
more secrets to me.... On the other hand, trust increases the likelihood of revealing per-
sonal secrets to others and thereby increases the exposure to gossip by increasing the circu-
20051
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Subsequent dissemination can also help the public understand ex-
isting social norms." Indeed, gossip is often central in theories of social
norm enforcement and change.22 Of course, there will be cases where
third parties who are kept in the dark stand to gain substantially from
learning information that someone else wants to guard. For example,
it may make society better off if a third party tells the faithful husband
of an adulterous wife about her dalliances. For these reasons, spread-
ing private information about others sometimes benefits society. The
tort for public disclosure of private facts therefore limits liability to
defendants who (1) publicize information that is (2) private, (3) not of
legitimate concern to the public, and (4) disseminated in a highly of-
fensive manner.3 The first limitation helps keep instances of minor
disclosure out of court, by requiring that the defendant spread the
information to a large number of people or, in some states, a smaller
number of people who have a special relationship with the subject of
that disclosure. The third limitation protects First Amendment inter-
ests and immunizes those who spread information that has substantial
social value." The fourth limitation helps ensure that run-of-the-mill
lation of material suitable for it: if you tell me in confidence a secret about yourself I can
pass it on to someone else and breach your trust. If we join the two effects together we find
that gossip ultimately should generate positional trust: it increases mutual trust among gos-
siping agents at the cost of breaching trust with those who are the object of gossip. The
overall effect on the amount of trust, however, is not clear.
21 See Ronald S. Burt, Bandwidth and Echo: Trust, Information, and Gossip in Social Net-
works, in James E. Rauch and Alessandra Casella, eds, Networks and Markets 30,37-38 (Russell
Sage 2001) ("Conversations about social structure are an integral part of building and maintain-
ing relationships, with the primary effect of reinforcing the current structure.") (emphasis added);
Donna Eder and Janet Lynne Enke, The Structure of Gossip: Opportunities and Constraints on
Collective Expression Among Adolescents, 56 Am Sociological Rev 494,494-95 (1991) (citing, for
example, a study finding that early adolescent girls rely more on gossip than direct ridicule to
clarify social norms).
22 See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Dis-
putes 57-59, 79-80 (Harvard 1991) (observing that rural ranchers use gossip as a self-help sanc-
tion to discipline those who allow their animals to stray or fail to do their share of fence mainte-
nance and financing). See also Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control at 85 (cited in note 8) (argu-
ing that gossip makes social groups more cohesive).
23 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D.
24 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law 260
(Chicago 1988) ("[P]rivacy is not allowed.., when the information has been judged necessary
for someone else to know in order to make decisions that she is entitled to make."). The legal
determination of "legitimate concern to the public" necessitates paternalistic judgments by
judges about what forms of information the public should receive and what forms of information
it should not receive. Even if there is great consumer demand for an unauthorized videotape of a
celebrity engaged in sexual intercourse, this does not necessarily, and in my view should not
necessarily, render the information of "legitimate concern to the public." See note 203. The pres-
ence of paternalistic judgments does not render privacy law paternalist, but it does indicate
judicial skepticism about whether market demand is an accurate proxy for welfare. For a critique
of privacy tort law on welfarist grounds, see generally Posner, 12 Ga L Rev 393 (cited in note 13)
(suggesting a legal privacy right based on economic efficiency that would protect certain trade
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information dissemination is not penalized and that relatively unob-
jectionable breaches of confidentiality do not clog the courts. But
what purpose does the second limitation serve?
In my view, tort law's public-private distinction furthers three
primary purposes. First, it grants the parties latitude to structure the
disclosure of information in a manner that furthers both parties' per-
ceived interests. If people really want to share the most intimate de-
tails about their sex lives on The Jerry Springer Show, the law lets
them do so. This is why there is no such thing as inherently private
information: in a nation where reality television and blogging are all
the rage, it is impossible to find a type of personal fact that no one has
shared with thousands of strangers. The law sensibly avoids paternal-
ism and defers to an individual's explicitly articulated decisions to
publicize information about himself, reasoning that he is in a better
position than the government to weigh the private benefits and costs
of this information dissemination and that the costs associated with
government intervention here usually exceed the associated social
benefits.' Deciding whether a disclosure was consensual thus plays apivotal role in determinations of whether particular facts are private."
and business secrets, unprotect most personal facts, and limit intrusive surveillance to surveil-
lance of illegal activities).
25 The law's deference to individuals' decisions stems from a belief that individuals are in a
better position than government officials to make decisions about sharing personal information.
That said, my analysis in this section suggests that there may be negative externalities associated
with an individual's voluntary disclosure of personal information about herself in circumstances
where that consent is not obvious to those who hear the voluntarily disclosed information. See
text accompanying notes 16-17. It may be appropriate, therefore, for the law to require that
viewers, listeners, and readers be exposed to evidence of the subject's consent in those cases
where media outlets disseminate previously private information about individuals.
26 Exceptions arise for a few categories of private speech. For example, the criminal law
prohibits adults from sharing with minors information relating to their own sexuality. See, for
example, John D. v Department of Social Services, 51 Mass App Ct 125, 744 NE2d 659 (2001)
(holding that a stepfather's repeated nudity in the presence of his teenage daughter, combined with
other sexual communications, constituted child abuse). These laws might also be couched as pro-
tecting consent, however, because the minors affected would be unable to effectively consent to
participate in these conversations and would be exposed prematurely to highly charged sexual con-
tent.
27 See Scheppele, Legal Secrets at 199-200, 203 (cited in note 24) (observing that in the
absence of fraud or coercion an initially voluntary disclosure generally cannot be grounds for an
invasion of privacy claim). The leading case for this proposition is Daily Times Democrat v Gra-
ham, 276 Ala 380, 162 So 2d 474, 478 (1964) (holding that although a person implicitly consents
to be photographed while out in public, when his status involuntarily changes to one embarrass-
ing to a reasonable person, he does not forfeit his right to be "protected from an indecent and
vulgar intrusion of his right of privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public
place"). For a discussion of consent as a defense in privacy tort cases, see William L. Prosser,
Privacy [A Legal Analysis], in Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 104,123 (cited
in note 9) (stating that gratuitous consent may be revoked at any time prior to the invasion of
privacy but that contractual consent is normally irrevocable if the publicity or appropriation
stays within the agreement's terms).
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For this reason, information disclosed to another person under false
pretenses that reasonably suggest confidentiality usually retains its
status as private information.
Second, the privacy element of the tort seeks to differentiate be-
tween those facts whose disclosure promotes intimacy and those whose
disclosure does not. If I share information with you that is widely
known and readily discoverable, that disclosure is unlikely to promote
intimacy between us. The law of privacy therefore does not bother to
offer these kinds of disclosures legal protection. Rather, the law pro-
tects only information that is secret enough so that its disclosure might
foster the development of meaningful social bonds.
That said, secrecy is not a sufficient condition for promoting inti-
macy. Hardly anyone knows my shoe size. But my informing you that I
typically wear a 9 does nothing to bring us closer. Intimacy depends
on not only secrecy or obscurity, but also on content. That is where the
"privacy" element and the "highly offensive to a reasonable person"
element of the privacy torts work together. Because of the privacy
element of the tort, outing a closeted homosexual may be tortious, 2
but outing Mary Cheney is not. Because of the "highly offensive" ele-
ment of the tort, publishing the closeted homosexual's shoe size is not
tortious, but revealing his sexual orientation may be. Where both ele-
ments are satisfied, we can be reasonably certain that the plaintiffs
initial disclosure of the information had the potential to promote inti-
macy. By trusting someone else enough to share information with him
Under the view laid out in this Article, consent is often a decisive consideration in privacy
cases. That said, it is unrealistic to expect that people will always reach formal agreements re-
garding subsequent dissemination in cases involving the disclosure of sensitive information.
Litigated privacy cases frequently involve legally unsophisticated plaintiffs, and the sharing of
confidential information is so common, and so central to society's flourishing, that formalizing all
such disclosures via binding contracts would be foolhardy. Many of the social interactions that
provide the facts for privacy law's leading cases involve non-repeat players, and highly improb-
able or surprising turns of events. The transaction costs associated with preventing these contro-
versies via contracts often will be prohibitive. In such cases, reasonable expectations of privacy
help "fill in the blanks" of a contract that the parties to a communication would have agreed to,
had they been able to do so costlessly.
28 See Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Pri-
vate Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J
857, 861 (1993) (arguing that disclosures of sexual orientation unrelated to any public issues and
merely satisfying public curiosity are unjustified invasions of privacy that can be remedied by
privacy torts); John P Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 Yale L J 747,
750 (1992) (arguing for a standard of newsworthiness that would grant First Amendment protec-
tion to disclosure of a public figure's homosexuality only when it is relevant to a legitimate pub-
lic concern). See also Keith J. Hilzendeger, Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does
Tort Law Protect the Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person's H1V-Positive Status?, 35 Ariz St L J
187, 188, 217-18 (2003) (arguing that in cases where a person's HIV-positive status has been
disclosed, the Restatement's approach to the public disclosure of private facts tort should limit
the requirement that the information not be of legitimate concern to the public).
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that is both obscure and sensitive, an individual attempts to enhance
the intimacy associated with the relationship.
Third, the privacy element helps courts evaluate causation in the
torts context. In order to discern whether the defendant has caused
the plaintiff's injury, we need to know whether the plaintiff would
have been injured in the absence of the defendant's intervention.29
This causal question is contained within the doctrinal inquiry of
whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation that the informa-
tion at issue would not be disseminated widely. To say that such an
expectation of privacy would have been unreasonable is to say that
there was a high risk of widespread dissemination regardless of what
any particular individual did with the information.
C. Privacy Can Be Objective and Descriptive
Given the functions of privacy law, one can imagine several paths
that courts might take to demarcate the boundaries between public
and private. The first fork in the road raises the question of whether
courts should define privacy on the basis of a normative inquiry or a
descriptive inquiry. Judges taking a normative tack might regard in-
formation about medical conditions, sexual orientations, and political
affiliations as inherently private, and information about child-rearing
attitudes, movie rentals, and internet chat room activities as inherently
public. But such a normative approach immediately encounters seri-
ous difficulties. First, individuals and communities will disagree sub-
stantially about what information is more private and what is more
public. Some homosexuals are closeted and hope to remain so, but are
happy to share information about what movies they've rented. Some
people are quite open about their sexual preferences, but zealously
avoid discussing their political or religious beliefs with others. Judges
represent an elite segment of society, and there is a real danger that
the standards of propriety that they introduce into the law will clash
with attitudes that reflect changing cultural beliefs and varied prefer-
ences among the citizenry." Second, normative disagreements about
29 Causation is not, in and of itself, an element in the public disclosure tort. See, for exam-
ple, Johnson v Sawyer, 4 F3d 369,382 n 69 (5th Cir 1993), revd on other grounds, 47 F3d 716 (5th
Cir 1995) (en banc). At the same time, my discussion of the case law in Part II will show that
when courts encounter privacy cases involving the plaintiff's disclosure of information to one or
more people other than the defendant, they tend to analyze the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" element in a manner similar to the way in which a tort lawyer would understand but-for
causation, asking whether the plaintiff's injury would have occurred in the absence of the defen-
dant's involvement.
30 Privacy is highly responsive to changes in technologies or social norms. Privacy law
ought to reflect democratic sentiments, not fight them. It would thus be a substantial mistake to
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what is or is not private may be impossible to resolve. People starting
with different cultural priors, based on age, race, religion, or economic
class, will reach very different conclusions about the morality of col-
lecting or publishing information about activities that a plaintiff would
prefer to keep private. Was it morally permissible for Senator John
Kerry to mention the sexual orientation of Vice President Richard
Cheney's daughter during the final 2004 presidential debate? There is
no objectively correct answer to this question," and any effort to
ground an answer in neutral principles, other than popular beliefs or
behaviors, is doomed.32 Perhaps because normative analysis leads to
dead ends with respect to whether information is appropriately char-
acterized as private or public, most courts view the "privacy" determi-
nation in tort law as a descriptive question.3
embed in the law the expectations of privacy that prevailed in one era, one society, or one court's
opinion. As Albert Alschuler has noted in the Fourth Amendment context,
[Flor a judge to elevate his personal visions of privacy above those of the rest of society
would be arrogant and inconsistent with appropriate concepts of judicial restraint. A test of
constitutional protection that looks to changing cultural sentiments may raise the specter of
adjudication by Gallup poll; but idiosyncratic judicial concepts of natural justice-visions,
for example, of an inherent human need for privacy at odds with the visions prevalent in
society-would have less claim to respect.
Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 NIU L Rev 1, 7 n 12
(1983).
Any normative framework regarding what should or should not remain private will be
highly contestable, which strengthens the case for privileging the descriptive over the normative,
as this Article does. Of course, one needs some normative principle for determining that privacy
is worth protecting. See Parts I.A and I.B. That said, the structure of the privacy torts already
makes normative considerations relevant. An actionable public disclosure or intrusion must be
"highly offensive to a reasonable person." Given that a violation of community standards is a
necessary, normative element of the tort, there is little justification for making the separate "pri-
vacy" element turn on normative calculations. This is another reason why I advocate a positivist
approach to privacy in this Article.
31 Compare Editorial, Outing Mary Cheney, Wall St J A14 (Oct 15,2004) ("By outing Mary
Cheney before millions of viewers on prime-time television, Messrs. Kerry and Edwards may
hope to score points with their base of gay activists."), with Brian Lehrer, Editorial, They'll Point
Fingers but Won't Show Their Hands-With the Media's Complicity, Candidates Attack Oppo-
nents and Avoid Discussing Ideas, Newark Star-Ledger 15 (Oct 27, 2004):
The Bush campaign is trying to focus voter attention on the fact that John Kerry mentioned
in the last debate that Dick Cheney's daughter is a lesbian. This takes the focus off the real
issue of what legal rights gay people should have and puts it on the fake issue of whether
Kerry invaded the privacy of someone who is already out and who was already an issue in
the campaign.
See also note 1.
32 For a fuller and more provocative exploration of these themes, see Randall P Bezanson,
The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News; and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 Cal L Rev 1133,
1159-62 (1992). Bezanson and I part ways, however, in that he believes that social norms have
broken down with respect to the communication of sensitive information, while I believe that
empirical studies of communication identify widely held norms and regularities.
33 See Part II and the cases discussed therein.
A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
None of this suggests that there is no role for normative analysis
in privacy law. I actually want to make a narrower claim than that. Two
of the elements of the public disclosure tort are inherently norma-
tive-elements three (not of legitimate public concern) and four
(highly offensive to a reasonable person) - but the other two, ele-
ments one (publicity) and two (privacy), are properly understood in
purely descriptive terms. For the intrusion tort, element three (highly
offensive to a reasonable person) is normative, but elements one (in-
tentional intrusion) and two (private affairs or concerns) are descrip-
tive. So when I say that privacy the "element" should be understood
purely descriptively, I do not mean that privacy the "concept" should
involve a purely descriptive inquiry. The concept demands both nor-
mative and descriptive inquiries.
Once a court decides to treat the question of whether the privacy
element is satisfied as a descriptive one, it reaches the second fork in
the road, which implicates the subjective-objective distinction. The
courts might ask what the parties actually expected when the plain-
tiff's initial disclosure occurred. Or they might examine what the par-
ties reasonably should have expected at the time of the initial disclo-
sure. For very good reasons, courts have focused on the latter inquiry.3
It seems daft to render the defendant liable for breaching a plaintiff's
unrealistic or foolhardy expectations of privacy. Moreover, evaluating
the parties' subjective expectations of privacy requires the courts to
try to get inside the parties' minds, and parties will often have strong
incentives to lie or otherwise shade their recollections about what
they expected. As explained below, many litigated privacy disputes
will involve cases where the plaintiff apparently expected that the dis-
closed information would remain private, but the defendant believed
that the plaintiff had no such expectation.3 ' For that reason, tort opin-
34 See, for example, Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 20 Cal 4th 907, 85
Cal Rptr 2d 909, 913 (1999); Multimedia WMAZ v Kubach, 212 Ga App 707, 443 SE2d 491, 494
(1994); YG. v Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, 795 SW2d 488,502 (Mo Ct App 1990).
35 In this sense, privacy tort law is quite different from Fourth Amendment law, which
ostensibly requires a court to examine both subjective and objective expectations of privacy. The
courts first ask whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, and if so, courts
examine whether that expectation of privacy is one that society ought to recognize as reasonable.
See Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan concurring). As a practical matter,
however, defendants virtually always claim to have a subjective expectation of privacy, and the
courts rarely second-guess those representations about the defendant's state of mind. When
courts do discuss the first prong, their analysis sometimes invokes the "reasonableness" issues
that ought to be analyzed under the second prong. See, for example, Smith v Maryland, 442 US
735, 742-43 (1979) (discussing the issue of whether telephone subscribers in general expect
privacy in the numbers that they dial but, strangely, considering this question as part of the first
prong of Katz). The second prong of Katz, the so-called objective prong, is therefore the locus of
most of the action under Fourth Amendment law. See, for example, James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond
Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Prov-
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ions have eschewed a subjective inquiry into the parties' states of
mind and focused exclusively on whether the parties should have ex-
pected dissemination or not.
This brings us to the final fork in the road. How might the courts
decide whether the parties' privacy expectations (or lack thereof)
were reasonable, particularly where those expectations differed sub-
stantially? Here again, there are at least two options in cases where
the plaintiff and defendant differed about whether they expected sub-
sequent dissemination to occur. The court can ask what most people
would have believed, given the context of the initial disclosure. Or the
court can ask about the probability that the information at issue
would have become public anyway in the absence of the defendant's
actions. As a theoretical matter, you could answer the first question by
taking a public opinion poll and the second question by modeling the
network of communicants to determine whether any dissemination
that did occur was likely or a mere fluke. The ideal answer to the sec-
ond inquiry would employ a sophisticated computer model that per-
fectly reflects social tendencies, and predicts the ex ante likelihood
that information disclosed from A to B will ultimately become widely
known in the relevant community. If dissemination was likely or inevi-
table, then the plaintiffs expectation of privacy at the time of the dis-
closure was unreasonable. If dissemination was highly unlikely, then it
was reasonable for the plaintiff to expect privacy.
Courts resolving privacy cases have decided to pursue the "com-
puter model" line of inquiry, ignoring the "public opinion" approach
ince, 36 Hastings L J 645, 651-54, 679-80 (1985) (noting that Katz's first prong has become de-
creasingly important relative to its second prong); David W. Cunis, Note, California v. Green-
wood- Discarding the Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 Cath U L
Rev 543,565 (1989) (observing that the Court in four cases has summarily glossed over the ques-
tion raised by the first prong of Katz); Jon E. Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood- Aban-
donment Gets Recycled from the Trash Pile- Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court's Rum-
maging Hands?, 41 Case W Res L Rev 581, 595 n 92, 601 (1991) (noting that the Court usually
uncritically accepts as fact any assertion by a defendant of a subjective expectation of privacy).
Two other differences are worth noting here. First, in the Fourth Amendment context, the
law deems the government agents' expectations of the plaintiffs privacy irrelevant. Rather, the
law focuses only on what the subject of the search expected, and whether those expectations
were reasonable. In the privacy tort context, by contrast, both parties' expectations might be
relevant. Before assigning civil liability to a defendant, a court might want to know whether the
defendant expected that the information in question was supposed to remain private. Second, in
the Fourth Amendment context, the federal courts have adopted a version of what I call the
hard-line approach to privacy. If an individual discloses information to a third party, that infor-
mation is deemed to have been disclosed to the entire world. See Part II.B and note 245. For
criticisms of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and arguments on behalf of "privacy in
public," see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting
the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 Tex L Rev 1349, 1364-66
(2004); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 Miss L J 213,215 (2002).
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to privacy. Unfortunately, they have done so without the benefit of any
obvious methodology, let alone the hypothetically perfect predictive
computer model I described in the previous paragraph. Lacking both
a computer model and an understanding of the science of social net-
works analysis, judges have relied on their intuitions to evaluate the
likelihood of information dissemination in a counterfactual world.
Judges seem to be asking themselves, "Had the defendant not become
involved, would I have expected this information to remain private
were I in the plaintiff's shoes?" I have suggested that this is the right
question to be asking. But the answers that courts have provided seem
to rely on guesswork more than anything else. We can use sociology, in
the form of social networks theory, to assess the accuracy of judges'
guesses, and perhaps to help them make better-educated guesses.1
6
D. "Computer Model" versus "Public Opinion"
Before we do that, it makes sense to discuss why the "computer
model" approach is preferable to the "public opinion" approach in the
tort context. There is, perhaps, an easy explanation for why courts
have not considered using a public opinion poll to resolve privacy tort
disputes: no scholar has suggested that they do so. But Christopher
Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have argued, quite forcefully, that
public opinion polls ought to be relevant to the courts as they decide
whether the subject of a government search had a "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.37 It is
not a large leap to apply Slobogin and Schumacher's Fourth Amend-
ment arguments in the tort context.
That said, in the tort context, making poll data decisive on the
privacy question might be ill-advised. Whatever the merits of Slobogin
and Schumacher's proposal as applied to searches and seizures, it is
not clear why it matters whether most people say they expect privacy
36 It might be argued that the Supreme Court requires nothing less of judges in such cir-
cumstances. See Alschuler, 4 NIU L Rev at 8 n 12 (cited in note 30) (describing the dictate of
Katz as asking that judges "assume the role of armchair sociologists and attempt to assess cul-
tural expectations of privacy").
37 Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society," 42 Duke L J 727,732,774-75 (1993) (surveying 217 persons in order to
gauge the impact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy and to ascer-
tain their understanding of the interests implicated by the various techniques, and suggesting
that courts consult such data in their search and seizure jurisprudence, "at least if community
values remain the lynchpin of search and seizure jurisprudence"). See also Slobogin, 72 Miss L J
at 273-75 (cited in note 35) (noting that there have been few U.S. polls inquiring into American
society's views on the intrusiveness of public camera surveillance, but offering results of United
Kingdom polls).
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in a particular setting. If large majorities of the American public tell
pollsters that "what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas," this need not
make the supposition a reasonable one. To the contrary, it seems that
courts would want to base substantive privacy law protections not on
what people say, but on what they do. Thus the courts may properly
inquire whether it was appropriate for the defendant (and many other
people like him) to believe that a particular disclosure would not be
disseminated widely.
Imagine a plausible situation where poll results deviate substan-
tially from actual, observed behavior. For example, assume that 80
percent of respondents say that if they found out about a friend's ex-
tramarital affair, they would tell that person's spouse. Now assume
that only 20 percent of people who find out about such affairs actually
do inform the affected spouses." Such a conflict makes the choice of
"computer model" versus "public opinion" matter, and whereas the
poll probably reflects people's aspirations (about what they should
do), the behavioral study reflects actual data about what is likely to
happen. People are social beings. They spend their entire lives disclos-
ing information about themselves and then seeing whether that in-
formation remains confidential or spreads through their circles of ac-
quaintances. To the extent that intelligent individuals are gauging
whether information they share with third parties will be shared fur-
ther, they will focus on observed behavior, not attitudes. Behavioral
data is thus preferable to survey data in privacy, just as reliable market
data is preferable to contingent valuation data in the realm of envi-
ronmental law. 9
A "public opinion" standard for evaluating reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy would create other problems as well. For one thing,
such a standard necessarily introduces circularity into the law. A well-
38 Divergences between poll results and behavioral data are common in the information
privacy context. For an interesting discussion of these divergences and how they might be inter-
preted, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Too Much Information: Privacy, Rationality, Temptation and
the Implications of "Willpower" Norms 8-13 (unpublished working paper September 2004),
online at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id=587950 (visited May 16, 2005). Similar divergences
between polling and observation arise in the family law context. Fianc6s who are aware of high
American divorce rates nevertheless assume that their own marriages will not end in divorce.
See generally Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L & Human Beh 439, 443
(1993) (indicating that although marriage license applicants' median response was an accurate
estimate that 50 percent of U.S. married couples will divorce, the median response was 0 percent
when assessing their own likelihood of divorce).
39 See Note, "Ask a Silly Question...": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages,
105 Harv L Rev 1981, 1982 (1992) (asserting that contingent valuation measurements of nonuse
values, which are derived from survey responses, are so speculative that their costs almost always
outweigh any benefits).
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publicized Supreme Court opinion holding that people have a reason-
able expectation of privacy against the use of infrared cameras to de-
tect heat emanating from their homes ° presumably will increase the
percentage of poll respondents who view such searches as unduly in-
trusive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed substantial uneasi-
ness about the possible circularity between people's expectations of
privacy and the content of privacy law." What's more, poll responses
can be manipulated rather easily based on the way in which a particu-
41lar question is framed. Slobogin and Schumacher point out that their
poll results will vary dramatically based on the subject of the search,
whether the search revealed anything, and whether the poll respon-
dent is asked about a search of himself or a search of a third party.
43
And polling is more uniform in the Fourth Amendment context,
where all fact patterns necessarily involve police surveillance. In the
tort context, the public's reaction to a possible privacy invasion will
depend heavily on the identities of the parties, the extent of the disclo-
40 Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27 (2001).
41 See Smith, 442 US at 740 n 5:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an
inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject
to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expecta-
tion of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.
Some have criticized the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for facilitating
the incremental erosion of people's privacy expectations. See, for example, Shaun B. Spencer,
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 San Diego L Rev 843, 860-62 (2002)
(asserting that the Supreme Court's expectation-driven concept of privacy is vulnerable to en-
croachment by actors powerful enough to influence social behavior and change societal expecta-
tions of privacy). This does not strike me as a particularly persuasive critique of privacy law.
Rather, the advantage of the reasonable expectations of privacy approach is its flexibility and
responsiveness to technological and social changes that affect privacy norms. In any event, a
theory of privacy grounded in a social networks theory/computer model approach will be re-
sponsive to technological changes as well.
42 See, for example, John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Re-
sponse: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences, 36 Am J Polit Sci 579, 579 (1992)
(stating that survey respondents react strongly to the context in which questions are asked, the
order in which options are presented, and wholly nonsubstantive changes in question wording);
Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 NC L Rev 567, 594-95 (2003) (questioning
whether opinion polls are a valid measure of public sentiment given their susceptibility to ques-
tion-framing manipulations).
43 Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L J at 759--60 (cited in note 37) (indicating that intru-
siveness rankings were highest when the participants were presented with a first-person scenario
where no evidence was found and lowest when the participants were presented with a third-
person scenario where evidence was found). For another report on the results of national polls
dealing with privacy matters and how responses have varied over time, see James E. Katz and
Annette R. Tassone, The Polls-A Report: Public Opinion Trends: Privacy and Information Tech-
nology, 54 Pub Op Q 125,133 (1990).
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sure, the purpose of the disclosure, the nature of the information dis-
closed, and various other facts.
The case for "computer model" data over "public opinion" data,
then, hinges largely on the law's preference for observational data
over survey data. A complete defense of computer modeling should
invoke two additional points. First, jury sentiment may be a decent
proxy for localized public opinion polls, substantially reducing the
value added by survey research. Second, in defamation cases that in-
volve privacy interests, the courts have long relied on a methodology
that is analytically similar to computer modeling. In cases involving
private figures or non-newsworthy events, defamation law focuses on
the truth or falsity of the defendant's statement. The law does not
focus on whether the defendant expected that the information at issue
was true, but on whether it actually was true. A newspaper that pub-
lishes a false story about a private figure may be liable, even if the
newspaper reporter believed the story to be true at the time of publi-
cation. As a result, the newspaper has a strong incentive to evaluate
the story's accuracy before publishing it. Evaluating privacy is no
more difficult for a would-be defendant than evaluating truth, and in
some cases it will be easier. And successful privacy claims, particularly
those involving public disclosure of private facts, necessarily involve
non-newsworthy facts and often involve private-figure plaintiffs. The
analog to defamation law, where misguided expectations are irrelevant
as to liability for private-figure plaintiffs, therefore buttresses the case
for a "computer model" approach. 5
It remains to be seen whether the "computer model" approach to
tort privacy is workable for resource-constrained courts. The answer
to that question depends, of course, on the state of the science, so this
Article will evaluate that important question in great detail. To fore-
shadow a bit, the models developed by social networks theorists are
becoming increasingly sophisticated at predicting whether informa-
tion will be disseminated widely through a given community. Though
their models remain far from perfect, there are already enough useful
insights to render social networks theory a superior alternative to
public opinion polls for evaluating the parties' reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy. Before reaching that section of the Article, I will
44 See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 327-28 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v
Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 US 749,761 (1985).
45 Nor does trade secret law consider the parties' expectations to be a substantial factor in
whether a valuable commercial idea has been shared so widely as to have lost its status as a trade
secret. See Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc v DEV Industries, Inc, 925 F2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir
1991).
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make the discussion more concrete by describing the tort law in some
detail.
II. THE LAW OF "LIMITED PRIVACY"
The American law eschews a categorical answer to the question
of under what circumstances a limited disclosure of private informa-
tion about one's self renders that information "public" for the pur-
poses of tort law. Puzzlingly, little legal scholarship has addressed this
central issue of privacy law."
A. "Limited Privacy"
Privacy law is better developed in California than in any other
U.S. jurisdiction, and it appears that California has most emphatically
accepted the concept of limited privacy. "Limited privacy" is the idea
that when an individual reveals private information about herself to
one or more persons, she may retain a reasonable expectation that the
recipients of the information will not disseminate it further.
The leading California case is the California Supreme Court's
1999 opinion, Sanders v ABC, Inc.4' Sanders involved the efforts of
Stacy Lescht, an ABC investigative journalist, to expose fraud in the
telephone psychic industry. To that end, she obtained employment as a
telephone psychic and used a hidden video camera to record her con-
versations with her new coworkers.4' One of these coworkers, Mark
Sanders, sued after part of his conversation with Lescht was broadcast
on ABC's PrimeTime Live program.9 Lescht argued that because
Sanders' coworkers could overhear her conversations with him, he
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication.0 The
court disagreed:
This case squarely raises the question of an expectation of lim-
ited privacy.... [P]rivacy, for the purposes of the intrusion tort, is
not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and
nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: the
fact that the privacy one expects in a given setting is not com-
plete or absolute does not render the expectation unreasonable
46 For a notable exception, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 Vand L Rev 1609, 1664-70 (1999) (embracing a limited privacy vision of the law and discuss-
ing it in several privacy law contexts, including abortion and information sharing over the internet).
47 20 Cal 4th 907,85 Cal Rptr 2d 909 (1999).
48 Id at 70.
49 See id at 70 n 1 (indicating that Sanders' claims against ABC based on the broadcast
were disposed of without trial).
50 See id at 75. Approximately one hundred telephone psychics worked at cubicles in a
large room. Id at 69.
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as a matter of law.... "The mere fact that a person can be seen by
someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally
be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.""
The court thus held that information can be public vis-A-vis one's
fellow employees, but private vis-t-vis the outside world. Sanders pre-
sumably would have suffered little damage if Lescht had played their
recorded conversations for fellow employees, but he had a cause of
action when she exposed millions of television viewers to the contents
of the conversations. Following a jury trial, Sanders was awarded
12$635,000 for intrusion upon seclusion . In other interesting contexts,
the California courts generally have adhered to the "expectation of
limited privacy" approach laid out in Sanders.53
This notion of "limited privacy" does not turn up only in intrusion
upon seclusion cases like Sanders. Rather, it has found receptive audi-
51 Id at 72, quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5.10(A)(2)
(West 1998).
52 Sanders, 978 P2d at 70-71 (including about $300,000 in exemplary damages after the jury
found that ABC had acted with malice, fraud, or oppression).
53 See, for example, M.G. v Time Warner, Inc, 89 Cal App 4th 623,107 Cal Rptr 2d 504,511-
12 (2001) (finding that Little League players and coaches had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in their team photo, after Sports Illustrated published the photo in a story about the team
manager's molestation of several team members); Pettus v Cole, 49 Cal App 4th 402, 57 Cal Rptr
2d 46,72-74 (1996) (concluding that an employee has a limited expectation of privacy in medical
information he provided to a physician hired by his employer for the purposes of evaluating the
employee's disability claim); Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128, 277 Cal Rptr 354, 360
(1991) (finding that a patient's disclosure of his HIV-positive status to a nurse, for the purpose of
warning her about the risk of infection, did not amount to consent for the nurse's supervising
physician to include the patient's HIV status in a report evaluating the patient's workers' com-
pensation claim); Times-Mirror Co v Superior Court, 198 Cal App 3d 1420, 244 Cal Rptr 556,
560-61 (1988) (concluding that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in having
witnessed the murder of her roommate by an at-large suspect, even though she had shared this
information with friends, relatives, and police officers).
The only California case that, at first glance, seems like a rejection of "limited privacy" un-
derscores just how far the principle extends. In Sipple v Chronicle Publishing Co, 154 Cal App 3d
1040, 201 Cal Rptr 665 (1984), the California courts held that a plaintiffs decision to share in-
formation about his homosexuality with members of the gay community deprived him of a cause
of action when a general circulation San Francisco newspaper mentioned his orientation after he
became a public figure by foiling an assassination attempt against President Ford. Id at 668-69.
Sipple argued that his willingness to share his sexual orientation with supportive gays hardly
indicated a willingness to share it with unsupportive heterosexuals. Indeed, Sipple's family
shunned him after they learned about his sexual orientation. Id at 667. The court held that Sip-
pie's sexual orientation had become a matter of public knowledge well before the defendant's
publication, citing the fact that Sipple's orientation was known to "hundreds of people in a vari-
ety of cities, including New York, Dallas, Houston, San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco."
Id at 669. The court further emphasized that several gay magazines had published stories refer-
encing Sipple's homosexuality. Id. Against this backdrop, and with Sipple gaining substantial
fame by virtue of his heroic act, id at 666, the court was incredulous that Sipple's poorly-kept
secret would have remained unknown to heterosexuals generally had the defendant not acted.
For further discussion of Sipple, see note 216.
2005] A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
ences in several other cases involving public disclosure of private facts.
Courts' willingness to accept "limited privacy" arguments in both the
intrusion and public disclosure contexts makes sense, since the intru-
sion tort's concept of privacy fully encompasses the conception of pri-
vacy that arises in the public disclosure context The two leading pub-
lic disclosure cases appear to be Missouri's YG. v Jewish Hospital"
and Georgia's Multimedia WMAZ, Inc v Kubach, 6 although a number
of other cases contain similar reasoning.7
YG. involved a couple who found themselves unable to conceive
a child naturally. They therefore underwent in vitro fertilization at the
defendant hospital, resulting in a pregnancy.8 Only hospital employees
and the mother of one of the plaintiffs knew about the couple's par-
ticipation in the in vitro program, and the couple apparently did not
tell others about their involvement because their church condemned
the practice.59 Several months into the wife's pregnancy, the couple was
invited to a party at the hospital to celebrate the in vitro fertilization
program's five-year anniversary." A camera crew and reporter from a
local television station were at the party, and, although the plaintiffs
refused to be interviewed and "made every reasonable effort" to avoid
being filmed, their image was used on the nightly news, with a voice-
over stating that the (unnamed) plaintiffs were expecting triplets as a
54 Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (defining intrusion upon seclusion as an
intentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns"), with § 652D (defining public disclosure as giving publicity "to a matter concerning the
private life of another"). It is difficult to imagine how something can be another's "private affair
or concern," but not "a matter concerning the private life of another."
55 795 SW2d 488 (Mo Ct App 1990).
56 212 Ga App 707,443 SE2d 491 (1994).
57 See, for example, Sheets v Salt Lake County, 45 F3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir 1995) (finding
that the plaintiff's having turned over a diary to police investigators did not indicate a willingness
to have the diary released to an author for use in a published book); Doe v B.PS Guard Services,
Inc, 945 F2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir 1991) (concluding that female models who undressed in each
other's presence had a cause of action against security guards who used a security camera to leer
at the models in various states of undress); Huskey v NBC, Inc, 632 F Supp 1282, 1288 (ND Ill
1986) (finding that a prisoner who exercised in a prison's exercise cage had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy against being filmed for a television broadcast, even though other inmates and
prison guards could see him exercising); Vassiliades v Garfinckel's, 492 A2d 580, 590 (DC 1985)
(concluding that a plaintiff had a privacy claim against a doctor who disclosed that she had un-
dergone plastic surgery, even though the plaintiff had told her family and friends about the pro-
cedure); Peckham v Boston Herald, Inc, 48 Mass App Ct 282, 719 NE2d 888, 891-92 (1999) (find-
ing that the plaintiff's disclosure to his daughter and two close friends of his involvement in a
paternity suit did not necessarily waive a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information).
See also Benitez v KFC National Management Co, 305 Ill App 3d 1027, 714 NE2d 1002, 1010
(1999).
58 YG., 795 SW2d at 492.
59 Id at 492-93.
60 Idat492.
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result of their participation in the program.' After the broadcast, the
plaintiffs were chastised by their church and the husband was ridi-
culed at his workplace. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had
waived any reasonable expectation of privacy as to their involvement
in the in vitro clinic by attending a party that forty other people also
attended? The court rejected this argument, holding that by attending
the party the plaintiffs "clearly chose to disclose their participation to
only the other in vitro couples. By so attending this limited gathering,
they did not waive their right to keep their condition and the process
of in vitro private, in respect to the general public.""
Similarly, in Kubach, the plaintiff was an HIV-positive man who
had disclosed his condition to relatives, "friends, medical personnel
and members of his AIDS support group," approximately sixty people
in all. 6 Kubach agreed to appear on a local television broadcast to
discuss AIDS, and was assured by station personnel that his face
would be digitized, and hence unrecognizable to the viewing audi-
ence.6 The station employee responsible for the digitization evidently
set the digitization setting too low, and Kubach was recognized by
members of his local community when the broadcast aired." After
Kubach sued the station for invasion of privacy, the station responded
by arguing that Kubach had waived his expectation of privacy in his
HIV status by disclosing it to his friends, relatives, acquaintances, and
medical service providers.?' The court disagreed, noting that Kubach
had made these disclosures to people who "cared about him ... or
because they also had AIDS."69 Although Kubach did not tell his
friends and relatives to keep his HIV status confidential, "there was
also testimony that they understood that plaintiffs condition was not
something they would discuss indiscriminately."'
These cases suggest that even if a plaintiff reveals information
about himself to dozens of people, and even if there are no legal or
contractual constraints on those people's ability to disseminate the
61 Id.
62 Idat493.
63 Id at 502.
64 Id.
65 443 SE2d at 494 & n 1 (stating that Kubach told "a relatively small number of people he
thought had reason to know of his disease").
66 Id at 493 (noting that Kubach would not have participated without this assurance). The
court's opinion makes no mention of Kubach pursuing a cause of action for breach of contract.
67 Id.
68 Id at 493-94 (noting the station's additional argument that Kubach had appeared on a
national television show where he allowed his back to be viewed undigitized and his voice to be
heard undisguised).
69 Id at 494.
70 Id.
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information further, the information can remain "private" for the pur-
poses of privacy tort law. Such information can remain private regard-
less of whether the people to whom the information was initially dis-
closed were the plaintiff's intimates (as in Kubach), coworkers (as in
Sanders), or strangers (as in YG.).
B. The Hard-Line Cases
Some opinions have rejected a plaintiffs invocation of limited
privacy, holding that his disclosure to a group of persons waived all
privacy expectations in the information. New York's Nader v General
Motors" has long been a landmark case in privacy law. The nation's
largest automobile manufacturer tried to discredit and intimidate con-
sumer advocate Ralph Nader prior to the publication of his best seller,
Unsafe at Any Speed." To that end, General Motors allegedly inter-
viewed Nader's close friends and business associates about his racial
and religious views, his sexual proclivities, his personal habits, and his
political beliefs.3 GM's agents secured these interviews by falsely tell-
ing the interviewees that they worked for a company at which Nader
was seeking employment." Nevertheless, the court rejected Nader's
claim that the interviews amounted to an intrusion upon Nader's se-
clusion or private affairs:"
Although those inquiries may have uncovered information of a
personal nature, it is difficult to see how they may be said to have
invaded the plaintiff's privacy. Information about the plaintiff
which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as
private to the plaintiff. Presumably, the plaintiff had previously
revealed the information to such other persons, and he would
necessarily assume the risk that a friend or acquaintance in
whom he had confided might breach the confidence."
The court thus found unpersuasive the argument that Nader's
disclosure to this network of close friends and associates maintained
the privacy of the information that he had shared. Indeed, the court
rejected a basic premise of limited privacy-the idea that one's associ-
71 25 NY2d 560, 255 NE2d 765 (1970).
72 Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (Grossman 1965).
73 Nader, 255 NE2d at 767.
74 Id. See also Recent Cases, Right of Privacy- Eavesdropping and Shadowing State Ac-
tionable Claims but Accosting, Interviewing Third Parties; Making Harassing Phone Calls and
Continuing Harassing Investigation Do Not. -Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N. Y2d 560,255
NE.2d 765,307 N. YS.2d 647 (1970), 83 Harv L Rev 1923,1926 n 16 (1970).
75 Because GM never publicly disclosed the dirt that it may have dug up on Nader, he sued
for intrusion upon seclusion rather than public disclosure of private facts.
76 Nader, 255 NE2d at 770.
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ates may be willing to share confidential information with people who
were considering employing Nader, but not with a corporation that
was trying to discredit him. According to the court, once one shares a
fact about himself with a friend, that fact is no longer private, as a mat-
ter of law.
A Michigan case, Duran v Detroit News, Inc,"8 provides further il-
lumination. Consuelo Sanchez Duran was a Colombian judge who had
indicted the notorious drug lord Pablo Escobar.9 After she and her
family received several death threats, she resigned from the bench and
fled the country. Duran took a job as the Colombian consul in Detroit,
and signed a lease for an apartment in the area. The State Depart-
ment hired security guards to protect Duran. She used her real name
when shopping in stores or eating at restaurants, and told a few of her
curious neighbors that she had been threatened by drug dealers.8' At
the same time, Duran "kept an unlisted telephone number, did not
join any social clubs or organizations, and did not attend any concerts,
sporting events, or motion pictures. ' A few months after Duran
moved to Detroit, local reporters exposed Duran's history and dis-
closed her address, providing readers and television viewers with pho-
tographs of her apartment complex."' At least one reporter also de-
scribed a $1 million bounty that the Colombian drug cartel had placed
on Duran's head." Duran sued the media outlets for public disclosure
of private facts, but the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision to grant the defendants summary judgment. In the court's as-
77 Alabama has followed Nader's approach in two recent opinions. Myrick v Barron, 820
S2d 81,85 (Ala 2001);Johnston v Fuller, 706 S2d 700,702-03 (Ala 1997).
The Ninth Circuit has held that Arizona courts would also reject an expansive application of
the doctrine of "limited privacy" enumerated by the California courts. Medical Lab Management
Consultants v ABC, Inc, 306 F3d 806,815 (9th Cir 2002):
The question before us then is whether Arizona law would recognize as objectively reason-
able [the plaintiff's] subjective expectation that his conversation with the ABC representa-
tives would not be broadly disseminated to others .... [W]e conclude that, under Arizona
law, [the plaintiff] could not have reasonably expected privacy against the ABC representa-
tives' secret videotaping of his communications with them. We conclude that the Arizona
Supreme Court would not recognize as broad an interest in limited privacy as the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has done.
78 200 Mich App 622,504 NW2d 715 (1993).
79 Id at 718.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id at 721.
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sessment, the plaintiff's actions in the United States had rendered her
identity "open to the public eye."'"
Fisher v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction" com-
pletes the trilogy of interesting hard-line opinions. In that case, the
plaintiff told four coworkers that some of her interactions with her
seven-year-old son had "sexual overtones."87 The court held that this
disclosure rendered the information nonprivate, such that the plain-
tiff's employer was free to disclose the information to her soon-to-be
ex-husband." In the court's view "the report merely recounts a con-
versation which the plaintiff publicly and openly conducted with her
fellow employees. The plaintiff's discussion of her personal experi-
ences were freely offered to the persons around her without concern
of the impact it might have on her character."9
85 Id at 720. Duran is not the only U.S. case holding that a private figure lacks an expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to normal conduct at a restaurant. See, for example, Stessman v
American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co, 416 NW2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1987) (finding that, even
though a plaintiff would have no reasonable expectation of privacy against being filmed while
eating in an ordinary restaurant, he might have such an expectation if seated in a restaurant's
private dining room).
86 61 Ohio Misc 2d 303,578 NE2d 901 (Ohio Ct Cl 1988).
87 Id at 903 (indicating that the topic of conversation was sexual situations involving minor
children).
88 Id. Fisher's disclosures were not communicated to a large audience, at least not until she
filed her lawsuit. Although some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, treat the public disclosure tort's
"publicity" element as having been satisfied by a disclosure to a small group of people with
whom the subject has a special relationship, Ohio rejects this approach. Compare Miller v Mo-
torola, 202 Ill App 3d 976, 560 NE2d 900, 903 (1990) (finding that the public disclosure require-
ment is satisfied where private information is disclosed only to the plaintiff's fellow employees),
with Fisher, 578 NE2d at 903 (refusing to construe defendant's mailing of plaintiff's statements to
her soon-to-be ex-husband's lawyer as a "publication to the public at large"). The Fisher court
identified the lack of publicity as an additional reason for dismissing Fisher's privacy claim. In
my view, Fisher's conception of publicity is far more appealing than Miller's. The Miller standard
will render some casual gossip by unsophisticated parties tortious. By making the relevant social
network for privacy law purposes a handful of people, Illinois law has the potential to deter a
great deal of socially valuable communication. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D,
comment a (siding with the Ohio view of publicity).
89 Fisher, 578 NE2d at 903 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit has embraced similar
reasoning in Fletcher v Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc, 220 F3d 871 (8th Cir 2000). In that
case, the court held that the plaintiff lost her reasonable expectation of privacy after informing
two coworkers that she had a staph infection. Id at 877-78. These coworkers spread the informa-
tion quickly, such that "[b]y the end of the day, both Fletcher's immediate supervisor... and... a
corporate manager in another town ... knew that Fletcher had been diagnosed with a staph
infection." Id at 878.
Another line of privacy authority is broadly consistent with the Nader/Fisher/Duran ap-
proach to limited privacy. This line of cases suggests that a subject does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to acts that occur in public places. See Daniel J. Solove and
Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 95-96 (Aspen 2003); Lance E. Rothenberg, Com-
ment, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to
Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 Am U L Rev 1127,1146-55
(2000). Hence, a couple photographed kissing at a farmer's market has no cause of action against
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By way of summary, then, what constitutes a "private" matter for
the purposes of privacy tort law is not obvious. The courts are not be-
ing terribly explicit or precise about why particular disclosures waive
privacy expectations and others do not. Certainly, a simple head-
counting approach does not reconcile the precedents. After all, Ku-
bach's disclosure of facts to sixty people did not render them public,
but Fisher's disclosure to four people did.+ Yet, as I will explain below,
both courts reached the appropriate results. Kubach's disclosure was
more "private" than Fisher's in important ways, his greater initial au-
dience notwithstanding.9'
All these cases involve judicial efforts to assess the flow of infor-
mation through social networks. At this point, it therefore seems ap-
propriate to examine how a sociologist might try to answer the ques-
tions that courts are considering in these kinds of cases.
III. SOCIAL NETWORKS THEORY
For the past several decades, sociologists, epidemiologists, com-
puter scientists, electrical engineers, economists, and researchers from
various other fields have been converging on an understanding of the
way that much of the world works, best described as "network the-
ory."92 The basic challenge of network theory is to understand how
a news magazine that published this photograph, Gill v Hearst Publishing Company, Inc, 40 Cal
2d 224, 253 P2d 441,444--45 (1953), a couple filmed walking from their home to a squad car has
no expectation of privacy in such footage, Reeves v Fox Television Network, 983 F Supp 703,709
(ND Ohio 1997), and a high school athlete whose genitalia were exposed in a soccer match
photograph that was published in a newspaper had no privacy cause of action, McNamara v
Freedom Newspapers; Inc, 802 SW2d 901, 905 (Tex Ct App 1991). If a tree falls in a public forest,
the images of its fall become public, even if the photographer who captures it on film was the
only person around to see it fall. But see Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 276 Ala 380, 162 S2d
474, 476 (1964) (permitting a tort suit by a woman who was photographed at a county fair with
her skirt blown up over her head, relying in part on the fact that the photographer was lying in
wait to catch the woman in an embarrassing situation); Cook v WHDH-TV, Inc, 37 Media L Rep
1242, 1999 WL 1327222, *5 (Mass Super Mar 4, 1999) (noting that "[clauses of action for intru-
sions on one's right to privacy ... are ordinarily foreclosed when the invasion occurs in a public
place" but holding, nevertheless, that the plaintiff might have a reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to his conduct in a Burger King parking lot).
90 Note that in numerical terms the Eighth Circuit has gone further than the Fisher court
did, holding that a plaintiffs disclosure of her staph infection to two coworkers deprived her of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Fletcher, 220 F3d at 877-78.
91 See text accompanying notes 217-21 and 227.
92 For accessible, cross-disciplinary analyses of network theory, see Duncan J. Watts, Six
Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (Norton 2003); Albert-Ldszl6 Barabisi, Linked: How
Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Every-
day Life (Penguin 2003).
Just one month after my paper appeared on SSRN, Thomas Smith posted a very interesting
working paper, in which he notes that federal case law is itself a scale-free network, with certain
precedents functioning as hubs and most functioning as obscure nodes. See Thomas A. Smith,
The Web of Law (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No 06-11, Spring 2005), online at
2005] A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
change occurs and is transmitted among adjacent units in any kind of
network.93 Perhaps surprisingly, the same basic insights about network
structure have been found applicable to a variety of disparate disci-
plines. For example, scholars studying the flow of electricity through
power grids have noticed substantial structural similarities to the way
that impulses make their way through the neural networks of various
species.' Similarly, epidemiologists are examining how diseases spread
through particular populations, looking at the levels of connectedness
between members of an at-risk population, in much the same way
that scholars of organizational structure have studied the overlapping
memberships of American corporate boards of directors, searching for
clues about the effects of inter-connectedness on corporate govern-
ance.' Whether scientists are discussing computer networks, social
networks," or biological networks, the same "scale-free" patterns of
network structure are frequently observable.
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=642863 (visited May 16, 2005). Smith's paper makes several
fascinating observations about the implications of this finding for the development of legal
precedent more generally. For an earlier application of a few aspects of network theory to inter-
national law, see Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmen-
tat Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va J Intl L 1, 4-5 (2002). See also Amitai
Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L Rev 1179, 1223-37 (discussing network structure
more generally).
93 Network theorists tend to focus on network structure and relationships as a means of
understanding social phenomena. See, for example, Timothy J. Rowley, Moving Beyond Dyadic
Ties: A Network Theory of Stakeholder Influences, 22 Acad Mgmt Rev 887, 897 (1997) (arguing
that dense networks lead to efficient communication and the establishment of shared behavioral
expectations).
94 See, for example, Duncan J. Watts, Networks Dynamics; and the Small-World Phenome-
non, 105 Am J Sociology 493,515-16 (1999).
95 See, for example, Fredrik Liljeros, et al, The Web of Human Sexual Contacts: Promiscu-
ous Individuals Are the Vulnerable Nodes to Target in Safe-Sex Campaigns, 411 Nature 907, 907-
08 (2001) (discussing how the structure of sexual partner networks should influence the use of
educational strategies to curtail the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases); David C. Bell,
John S. Atkinson, and Jerry W. Carlson, Centrality Measures for Disease Transmission Networks,
21 Soc Networks 1 (1999) (analyzing data from a study of more than one hundred networks of
drug users and nonusers in high drug-use neighborhoods in Houston, Texas to determine how
HIV spreads among such networks).
96 See, for example, Gerald E Davis, Mina Yoo, and Wayne E. Baker, The Small World of
the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001,1 Strategic Org 301,321-22 (2003), observing that:
On average any two of the 4538 directors of the 516 largest US firms ... in 1999 could be
connected by 4.3 links, and any two of the boards are 3.5 degrees distant. Mills saw a small
set of private schools, such as Groton and Exeter, providing an essential agency for socializ-
ing and organizing members of the upper class, and Mintz and Schwartz argued for a special
role for money-center banks in knitting together corporate directors. But our results sug-
gest that the small-world organization of the corporate elite is an emergent property of
networks qua networks and requires no coordinating mechanism whatsoever, for the same
reasons that brains, power grids, and the World Wide Web are also small worlds.
97 "[Social networks consist] of a set of individuals and of the links among them. Links
between pairs of individuals might represent a wide range of connections, including such activi-
ties as friendship, advice seeking, informational communication, and material transfers." David
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A. An Overview of Social Networks
A scale-free network, sometimes called a "power-law" network,
has a very large number of poorly connected nodes (called "peripher-
als") and a smaller number of highly connected nodes (called "super-
nodes" or "hubs") that actively transmit lots of data to many other
nodes. We can contrast this scale-free structure with a random net-
work structure, where one would expect each node in a network to
have approximately the same number of links to other nodes. This
distinction becomes relevant to our purposes because it turns out that
most human social networks, particularly information networks, are
scale-free.)°
Figure 1 contrasts a "pure" scale-free structure on the left, with a
random structure on the right. In the pure scale-free network each
(relatively isolated) peripheral actor (P) is connected to a single (well-
connected) supernode (S).1' There are a total of eight links in the
scale-free network, each represented b, a line. In the random network,
there are also a total of eight links among actors, and each actor is
connected to between one and three other actors. Even a cursory ex-
amination of the diagrams below shows that a scale-free structure is
far more efficient at linking up a society of actors, provided, of course,
that all connections and actors are stable, and that there is no danger
of network congestion. For example, P, and P, can be connected via
two links in the scale-free network, as can any other peripherals. In
the random network, however, connecting actors presents much
greater difficulties. Linking up P, and P3 requires connecting via P, P4,
P8, and P. Indeed, with only eight connections and nine actors, there is
a substantial possibility that the members of a random network will
Krackhardt and Robert N. Stem, Informal Networks and Organizational Crises:An Experimental
Simulation, 51 Soc Psychology Q 123,127 (1988).
98 Watts, Six Degrees at 107 (cited in note 92); Lada A. Adamic and Eytan Adar, Friends
and Neighbors on the Web, 25 Soc Networks 211,215 (2003) (noting that the distribution of links
to and from internet homepages mirrored real-world social networks; like social networks, in
which most people only have a few close ties but some people have many, most homepages had
just a few links either to or from them, but a few homepages had many).
99 Watts, Six Degrees at 107 (cited in note 92).
100 See Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 Am J Sociology 349, 351-52
(2004) (examining networks among managers in a large electronics company); Adamic and Adar,
25 Soc Networks at 215 (cited in note 98); Daniele Bondonio, Predictors of Accuracy in Perceiv-
ing Informal Social Networks, 20 Soc Networks 301, 306 (1998) (examining social networks
among coworkers); Rebecca W. Tardy and Claudia L. Hale, Getting "Plugged In": A Network
Analysis of Health-Information Seeking Among "Stay-at-Home Mom.%" 65 Commun Monographs
336, 352-53 & table 3 (1998) (examining social networks among stay-at-home mothers in a tod-
dler playgroup); A. Kimball Romney and Katherine Faust, Predicting the Structure of a Commu-
nications Network from Recalled Data, 4 Soc Networks 285, 296 (1982) (examining social net-
works generally).
101 For an explanation of this terminology, see text accompanying notes 110-11.
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not be able to connect at all. If one removes the linkage between P4
and P5, and replaces it with a linkage connecting P7 and P6, at least two
of the actors (P1 and P5) will become entirely isolated from the group.
FIGURE 1
Scale-Free Networks versus Random Networks
"Pure" Scale-Free Network Random Network
P1  P2 P3  P1  P2  P3
P4  S P 5  P4  P5  P6l
P6  P7  Ps P7  P8  P9
In the context of social connections, the scale-free social structure
can be illustrated using the only social networking game that has
penetrated American popular culture: Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon. In
1994, fraternity brothers at Albright College discovered that the actor
Kevin Bacon could be connected to virtually all of the roughly half a
million people who had acted in feature films since 1898.' The stu-
dents popularized a game, the object of which was to figure out how to
connect a particular actor to Kevin Bacon in the fewest number of
links possible. For instance, the actor Laurence Fishburne appeared in
Mystic River with Kevin Bacon in 2003. Fishburne is one of 1,806 ac-
tors with a Bacon number of one. Carrie-Anne Moss has not appeared
in a film with Kevin Bacon, but costarred in the Matrix films with
Laurence Fishburne, so she has a Bacon number of two, along with
145,024 other actors. Justin Allder is one of 395,126 actors who has a
Bacon number of three, having appeared in the obscure 1996 film
102 See The Oracle of Bacon at Virginia, online at http://www.cs.virginia.edu/oracle (visited
May 16, 2005) (noting that 12 percent of the movie actor universe cannot be linked to the rest of
the movie universe, either because they appeared in straight-to-video films not included in the
Internet Movie Database, or because they have not appeared in any films with mainstream
Hollywood actors). The Kevin Bacon game is commonly used to illustrate network theory prin-
ciples. See, for example, Barabldsi, Linked at 58-62 (cited in note 92); Watts, Six Degrees at 93-95
(cited in note 92); David L. Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law's Use of Science: The Epi-
demic of Scientific Sophistication that Began with DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts, 67 Brooklyn L
Rev 111,119-20 (2001).
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Sabotage with Carrie-Anne Moss, who appeared in the Matrix films
with Laurence Fishburne, who appeared in Mystic River with Kevin
Bacon."
The average actor in the Internet Movie Database " has a Bacon
number of 2.946'0'-meaning that he can be connected to Kevin Bacon
through fewer than two other actors. This means Bacon is quite well
connected to Hollywood actors, but there are actually 1,048 actors in
the Internet Movie Database who are even better connected than
Kevin Bacon."' Rod Steiger-yes, Rod Steiger°-was evidently the
best connected Hollywood actor of all time, with the average Internet
Movie Database actor having a Rod Steiger number of 2.679 as of
June 2004.20
This data from the Internet Movie Database helps us understand
the way in which human social networks work. There are hundreds of
thousands of obscure actors in the Internet Movie Database, such as
Deborah Reagan, who appeared in only two films during her career.
She happens to have a Kevin Bacon number of one, because she
played Kevin Bacon's wife in the 1979 film, Starting Over. (Bacon and
Reagan had bit parts in that movie.) In any event, we can contrast the
plethora of Deborah Reagans with the few thousand Kevin Bacons
and Rod Steigers who connect everyone in the actors' guild to every-
one else.'9 Reagan has a Bacon number of one, but her presence in the
Internet Movie Database isn't facilitating anyone else's connections.
She's just taking up space at the periphery.
103 See Who Is the Center of the Hollywood Universe?, online at http://www.cs.virginia.edu/
oracle/center.html (visited May 16,2005) (calculating Bacon numbers as of June 29,2004).
104 See http://www.imdb.com (visited May 16,2005).
105 Who Is the Center of the Hollywood Universe? (cited in note 103).
106 Id.
107 Steiger is best known for playing Charley in On the Waterfront, where he acted opposite
Marion Brando in the famous "I could've been a contender" scene. Steiger won the Best Actor
Academy Award for the 1967 film In the Heat of the Night. See Internet Movie Database, online
at http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001768 (visited May 16,2005).
108 The remainder of the top ten list consists of Christopher Lee, Dennis Hopper, Donald
Sutherland, Harvey Keitel, Donald Pleasence, Max von Sydow, Michael Caine, Martin Sheen,
and Anthony Quinn. Karen Black is the most connected actress-she ranks twenty-first of
all time. See The Center of the Hollywood Universe, online at http://www.cs.virginia.edu/oracle/
centerlist.html (visited May 16,2005).
109 One variation on the Kevin Bacon game involves non-actors. Ordinary citizens can
compare how many degrees of separation they are from Kevin Bacon, using personal connec-
tions instead of acting roles. This version of the Kevin Bacon game recently was made the subject
of a successful Visa television commercial. See Kevin Bacon Central, Six Degrees of Kevin Ba-
con, online at http://www.allstarz.org/kevinbacon/six.htm# (visited May 16,2005).
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As we imagine our own lives and our own social networks, we can
all identify some Kevin Bacons and lots of Deborah Reagans."' There
are people who stay in touch with old friends, throw dinner parties,
play matchmaker, and, most importantly, have close friends in a vari-
ety of different cliques. These are the Kevin Bacons of the world: soci-
ety's supernodes."' The Deborah Reagans of the world, by contrast,
are more isolated, hermitted, and aren't introducing people who
wouldn't otherwise meet each other. Deborah Reagan may have some
friends, but her friends all know one another already, so she's not fa-
cilitating new connections. She is a classic peripheral.
A real social network, of course, is more complicated than the
Kevin Bacon actors' network. Most pertinently, a real social network
is dynamic, not static. People are constantly making new connections,
and old connections are disappearing through death, quarrels, geo-
graphic constraints, or simple indifference.' 2 Each of us can recall
friends from elementary school, high school, or college with whom
we've lost touch, along with scores of former neighbors, coworkers,
service providers, and acquaintances. In the Kevin Bacon world, by
contrast, Rod Steiger continues to promote network connectedness
even though he died more than three years ago. Still, the similarities
between an actors' network and a normal social network are substan-
tial. While communications networks among humans generally are not
"pure" scale-free networks like the one pictured in Figure 1, they do
110 This is particularly true once we exclude kin from a person's social network. Kin rela-
tionships are less voluntary than other kinds of relationships, and most people maintain at least
some connections to their families. Kin thus play a role in promoting the equalization of social
network size among introverts and extroverts. See Henry W. Irving, Social Networks in the Mod-
ern City, 55 Soc Forces 867,868 (1977).
111 See Herminia Ibarra and Steven B. Andrews, Power, Social Influence, and Sense Making:
Effects of Network Centrality and Proximity on Employee Perceptions, 38 Admin Sci 0 277,279
(1993). For a typology of different types of supernodes, see Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control
at 101 (cited in note 8).
As used in this Article, having many friends and acquaintances does not suffice to make an
individual a supernode. Rather, the supernode has many friends and acquaintances who are not
independently connected and actively shares information with many of those far-flung friends
and acquaintances. Thus, someone who is very discreet but has many friends may well be an
ordinary node, whereas someone who is constantly sharing new information with a smaller num-
ber of friends would be a supernode.
112 See Ronald S. Burt, Bridge Decay, 24 Soc Networks 333, 333-34 (2002) (studying net-
work relationships among bankers in a large organization and concluding that "bridge" relation-
ships-those that span two social groups-decay remarkably quickly despite their demonstrative
value as social capital); Karen Klein Ikkink and Theo van Tilburg, Broken Ties: Reciprocity and
Other Factors Affecting the Termination of Older Adults' Relationships, 21 Soc Networks 131,
142-45 (1999) (arguing that relationships with children, children-in-law, other kin, friends,
neighbors, and non-kin are increasingly likely to decay, and it is more likely these relationships
will decay if they are nonreciprocal, that is, if one member of the relationship benefits more from
it than the other).
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exhibit a strong tendency toward scale-free structure, with substantial
clustering among members, and a minority of supernodes who facili-
tate the interactions between members who would not otherwise
meet."3 Moreover, ties among members of well-connected social clus-
ters can be expected to become stronger as time passes. The more time
I spend socializing with Joe, the higher the odds become that I will be
introduced to one of Joe's other good friends.
1 4
All that said, what's interesting about the Kevin Bacon network is
precisely what's interesting about human societies in general. A rural
farmer in Omaha and a banker in Boston may be separated by only a
few links, and yet they will live their entire lives oblivious to each
other's existence."' When exponential functions like these operate,
humans are sometimes genuinely surprised. Two strangers seated next
to each other on an airplane might utter with great sincerity the cli-
ch6d observation that "it's a small world" upon realizing that they
both know someone in common who resides in a distant city. The dan-
ger, however, is not this occasional surprise. The danger, at least from a
privacy perspective, is that people learn to stop being surprised by
these encounters, and guard their personal information too much as a
consequence. " ' Even though our farmer and banker might be con-
nected through only a few links, it will be exceedingly rare for one of
them to hear a story about the other. When only a few or no links
connect a group of Boston bankers and Omaha farmers, they are
separated by what Ronald Burt calls a "structural hole," a lack of ef-
fective ties between the groups that renders the probability of infor-
mation exchange quite low, even if both parties could benefit substan-
tially from such communication."
113 See note 100.
114 See Scott L. Feld, The Focused Organization of Social Ties, 86 Am J Sociology 1015,
1019-20 (1981).
115 This small-world phenomenon was examined by Jeffrey Travers and Stanley Milgram in
1969. Travers and Milgram designated three "starting populations" -one composed of Boston
residents, one of Nebraska residents, and one of blue-chip stockholders in Nebraska-and asked
them to send a letter to a first-name acquaintance in order to advance the letter toward a target
individual, a Boston stockbroker. Each recipient was similarly asked to send the letter on to a
first-name acquaintance, still with the goal of reaching the target. Of the 217 original letters, 64
eventually reached the target, and the average distribution chain contained 5.2 links between the
starter and the target. See Jeffrey Travers and Stanley Milgram, An Experimental Study of the
Small World Problem, 32 Sociometry 425,431-33 (1969).
116 Indeed, some social networks research suggests a tendency for this to occur. See Ece
Kumbasar, A. Kimball Romney, and William H. Batchelder, Systematic Biases in Social Percep-
tion, 100 Am J Sociology 477, 498 (1994) (finding that people systematically overestimate the
extent to which their friends communicate with each other).
117 Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition 18 (Harvard 1992)
("The hole is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric circuit. As a result of the hole between them,
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This point is critical to the study of how previously private infor-
mation spreads through society. In scale-free social networks, there is
always the potential that information any person discloses to any other
person will spread to the entire world."' By some fluke, any bit of in-
formation might be widely distributed. Yet, as I will argue below, in
light of the prevalence of structural holes between certain social net-
works, people will be well served by ignoring this possibility, and the
law ought to validate their decision to do so. Relatedly, whether in-
formation becomes "public" will depend on whether it reaches a super-
node or not, and whether the supernode finds the information worth
disseminating. As I will suggest in Part IV, the fact that information
has reached one defendant supernode hardly renders it inevitable that
it would have reached another supernode in the defendant's absence.
B. The Strength of Weak Ties
There are people with whom we frequently exchange information
about a number of different topics, and people with whom we share
less information about a narrower range of topics. Sociologists gener-
ally refer to relationships falling into the former category as "strong
ties" or "high intensity" and relationships falling into the latter cate-
gory as "weak ties" or "low intensity.''19 Assume I have two neighbors.
Neighbor A and I frequently discuss work, sports, television, romantic
involvements, and politics. Neighbor B and I occasionally discuss the
weather and exchange pleasantries. My relationship with A is a strong
tie. My relationship with B is a weak tie.
In the real world, we can map these relationships onto organiza-
tional structures. Imagine a large law firm in a big city. As a general
matter, attorneys within the tax department will have relatively strong
ties to other attorneys in the same firm's tax department, and weaker
ties to attorneys in the firm's intellectual property litigation depart-
the two contacts provide network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than overlap-
ping.").
118 This is true of all information. A joke I tell one other person could conceivably spread to
the entire United States population. And yet, to the best of my knowledge, that's never occurred.
Perhaps if my jokes were funnier ...
119 See John Scott, Social Network Analysis 32 (Sage 2d ed 2000); Gabriel Weimann, The
Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of Information and Influence, 5 Soc Networks
245, 246 (1983). See also Daniel J. Brass, Kenneth D. Butterfield, and Bruce C. Skaggs, Relation-
ships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network Perspective, 23 Acad Mgmt Rev 14, 17 (1998)
("The strength of a relationship refers to the frequency, reciprocity, emotional intensity, and
intimacy of that relationship. Casual acquaintances, represented by infrequent interaction and
indifferent affect, are characterized by weak ties.").
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ment.' ° There will be some strong ties that cross departmental lines-
for example, the attorneys who serve on the firm's hiring committee
or management committee are likely to spend a great deal of time
talking to each other. But as a general matter, intradepartment ties
will be stronger and interdepartment ties will be weaker.
As one moves outside the firm, the same patterns hold. A tax at-
torney at Jenner & Block LLP in Chicago may have strong ties to a
tax attorney at Kirkland & Ellis LLP in Chicago, based on having
worked on deals together in the past or simultaneous service on bar
association committees. But most professional ties outside of one's
own law firm will be weak ties, and in a large city like Chicago, the
vast majority of lawyers will not know each other personally.121 That
said, the social distance between an intellectual property litigator at
Kirkland & Ellis and a tax attorney at Jenner & Block will not be sub-
stantial. There is probably at least one person who knows both law-
yers, and so an introduction between the two attorneys could be ar-
ranged rather easily.2
Mark Granovetter's work on "the strength of weak ties" has be-
come a canonical text in the study of social networks. Granovetter
observed that social networks tend to be highly clustered: I have very
close ties to people in my family, but they have close ties to each other,
too, and their connectedness is not dependent on me. People within
120 See Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing
Knowledge Across Organization Subunits, 44 Admin Sci Q 82, 106 (1999) (discussing a similar
phenomenon among engineers).
121 See John P. Heinz, et al, The Constituencies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 L & Socy Rev
441,448 (1997) (noting that even highly prominent members of Chicago's legal community were
not directly tied to most lawyers surveyed).
122 Indeed, directed networking seems to occur within large law firms with some regularity.
When I worked at a large Seattle law firm, someone would occasionally send out an email to all
the lawyers at the firm asking if anyone knew Mr. So-and-So. Mr. So-and-So was usually a poten-
tial client, mediator, or co-counsel. Another effective strategy would be to obtain Mr. So-and-
So's Martindale-Hubbell biography, and then search for people within one's own firm who share
a possible tie. Most obviously, one might look for someone who graduated from the same law
school at roughly the same time.
123 Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 Sociologi-
cal Theory 201 (1983).
124 Id at 201-02. Other studies of social networks have found substantial clustering of social
ties within racial and ethnic groups. See Charles Korte and Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Net-
works Between Racial Groups: Application of the Small World Method, 15 J Personality & Soc
Psychology 101, 107 (1970) (discussing the results of another small-world experiment involving
letter chains where white subjects had particular difficulty in connecting with black targets in
separate, racially-based social networks). In another study, Gabriel Weimann examined the abil-
ity of Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in Israel to reach target individuals through chains of social
connections. He found substantial segregation of social networks along ethnic lines and deter-
mined that efforts to contact a target individual often failed because of a lack of contacts be-
tween Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Gabriel Weimann, The Not-So-Small World: Ethnicity and
Acquaintance Networks in Israel, 5 Soc Networks 289,297-98 (1983).
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a closely knit network are likely to be quite similar to one another-
they may share the same jobs, neighborhoods, last names, knowledge
base, or alumni connections.", As a result, relationships within a close-
knit group have high levels of transitivity ' - all of my friends on my
law school's faculty are friends with each other as well. This makes
information redundant within a network of people bound together by
strong ties. By the time I learn new and interesting information from a
colleague, it is likely that other colleagues with whom I am strongly
tied would have already learned it, or will learn it soon enough even if
I do not tell them.
Strong ties are plainly a source of strength, but relying exclusively
on close ties for sources of information is a bad idea. As Granovetter
argues: "[I]ndividuals with few weak ties will be deprived of informa-
tion from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the
provincial news and views of their close friends..27 Granovetter sug-
gests that the economically disadvantaged tend to rely too much on
strong ties."" And because strong ties are so much costlier to maintain
than weak ties, ' poor people's heavy investments in strong ties pre-
clude them from developing valuable weak ties.
Granovetter's research suggests that weak ties are often critical in
helping individuals learn about new job opportunities.' ° Weak ties
serve a "bridging" function, transferring new information from one
closely knit group to another."' Information gained from weak ties is
therefore more likely to be new and nonredundant. Granovetter
found that weak ties were particularly instrumental in helping manag-
ers and professionals find jobs. ' Notably, each individual weak tie has
125 See Granovetter, 1 Sociological Theory at 204 (cited in note 123).
126 Id at 218; Weimann, 5 Soc Networks at 260-63 (cited in note 119).
127 Granovetter, 1 Sociological Theory at 202 (cited in note 123).
128 Id at 213. See also Matthijs Kalmijn, Shared Friendship Networks and the Life Course:
An Analysis of Survey Data on Married and Cohabiting Couples, 25 Soc Networks 231, 246
(2003) (finding that well-educated people have more friends, but spend less time with them, than
their lesser-educated counterparts); Brian R. Patterson, Communication Network Activity: Net-
work Attributes of the Young and Elderly, 43 Commun Q 155 (1995) (finding that, as they age, the
elderly tend to rely more on strong ties and less on weak ties).
129 Hansen, 44 Admin Sci Q at 105 (cited in note 120); Giuseppe Labianca, Daniel J. Brass,
and Barbara Gray, Social Networks and Perceptions of Intergroup Conflict: The Role of Negative
Relationships and Third Parties, 41 Acad Mgmt J 55, 58 (1998). See generally Krackhardt and
Stem, 51 Soc Psychology Q at 127-28 (cited in note 97):
[I]ndividuals have a limited amount of time, energy, and need for the social interaction and
intimacy which are demanded in maintaining friendships. Given this assumption, one will
find, on the average, a tradeoff between the number of friends one can maintain outside the
subunit and the number one can maintain inside the subunit.
130 Granovetter, 1 Sociological Theory at 205 (cited in note 123).
131 Weimann, 5 Soc Networks at 264-65 (cited in note 119).
132 Granovetter, 1 Sociological Theory at 208 (cited in note 123).
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a low probability of transferring useful information, but because so
many weak ties exist, their sheer numbers make them, in the aggre-
gate, a critical source of new and valuable information. ' Strong ties
could be useful too, particularly in job-seeking contexts where an un-
employed person needed help from a social contact who was highly
motivated to help him find work.'
Granovetter's analysis of how information about job openings
gets transmitted through a social network has obvious applications to
the study of information diffusion generally. Information dissemina-
tion through the wider society often depends on weak ties:
What makes cultural diffusion possible, then, is the fact that small
cohesive groups who are liable to share a culture are not so cohe-
sive that they are entirely closed; rather, ideas may penetrate
from other such groups via the connecting medium of weak ties.
It is a seeming paradox that the effect of weak ties, in this case, is
homogenization, since my emphasis has been the ability of weak
ties to reach out to groups with ideas and information different
from one's own. The paradox dissolves, however, when the proc-
ess is understood to occur over a period of time. The ideas that
initially flow from another setting are, given regional and other
variations, probably new. Homogeneous subcultures do not hap-
pen instantly but are the endpoint of diffusion processes."'
In Granovetter's framework, weak ties help explain the spread of eve-
rything from knowledge to fads from one edge of the global social
network to the other. Follow-up work by other sociologists has re-
vealed that weak ties are particularly important in spreading gossip
and news, but information about new products and consumer oppor-
tunities is generally spread through stronger ties."6 The chief advan-
tage of information diffusion through weak ties stems from the rapid-
ity with which information is transmitted between different close-knit
groups.'3 Information transmitted via strong ties generally spreads less
quickly, but is more accurate and credible.' -
Those who actively spread information via many weak ties func-
tion as supernodes, and are likely to gain economic and status advan-
tages because they are the first members of their close-knit groups to
133 See Noah E. Friedkin, Information Flow Through Strong and Weak Ties in Intraorgani-
zational Social Networks, 3 Soc Networks 273,284-85 (1982) (examining the effect of tie strength
on the probability of information flow).
134 Granovetter, 1 Sociological Theory at 209 (cited in note 123).
135 Id at 215-16.
136 See Weimann, 5 Soc Networks at 254-55 (cited in note 119).
137 Id at 258.
138 Id.
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learn about new information that has originated in far-flung, close-knit
groups."9 These supernodes tend to be happier and better informed
than the peripherals - supernodes are more likely to be perceived as
"leaders" and are more likely to earn promotions within a work-
place." Supernodes maintain their privileged status by continuing to
serve as information clearinghouses, and, in certain contexts, become
supernodes based in part on their willingness to share previously pri-
vate information about themselves.'
That said, there will be certain types of information that do not
lend themselves to communication via weak ties. For example, schol-
ars studying product innovation have suggested that weak ties func-
tion quite well at facilitating searches for stand-alone information, but
are not particularly successful means of transferring complex knowl-
edge."2 This suggests an aggregation difficulty -if two different people
have two pieces of information that must be aggregated to yield a use-
ful result, it is more likely that they will "put two and two together" if
they are bound by a strong tie. For example, investigations into the
September 11 hijackings have revealed that various people in gov-
ernment understood different parts of the terrorist conspiracy, but
because there were structural and legal limitations on their ability to
139 See Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, An Analysis of Rumor, 10 Pub Op Q 501,512
(1946-1947) (discussing the prestige associated with being the first to share truthful, newsworthy
information with a group). While supernodes tend to be the highest-status individuals in a social
network, there may be costs associated with supernode status in certain contexts. For example,
Wayne Baker and Robert Faulkner found that central players in price-fixing conspiracies faced a
greater risk of prosecution and longer sentences than peripheral members of such conspiracies.
Wayne E. Baker and Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks
in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 Am Sociological Rev 837, 854 (1993). Baker and
Faulkner suggest that there are more possible witnesses who can cooperate with government
prosecutors and testify against a supernode. Because a more peripheral member has fewer con-
tacts within the conspiracy, there are fewer people who could testify against him. Id at 855 n 14.
This seems plausible, but I also suspect that prosecutors view the supernodes of criminal con-
spiracies as more culpable than the peripheral members, so they may seek harsher sentences
against these individuals. For another discussion of gossip and information flow issues unique to
the organized crime setting, see Gambetta, 35 Archives Europdennes de Sociologie at 220-22
(cited in note 8) (suggesting that mafiosi's obsession with secrecy impedes gossip).
140 See Daniel J. Brass, Being in the Right Place: A Structural Analysis of Individual Influ-
ence in an Organization, 29 Admin Sci Q 518, 520, 532 (1984) (explaining that individuals with a
high level of network centrality have greater access to and control over resources leading to
increased influence and a better chance of promotion); Ronald S. Burt, The Social Capital of
Opinion Leaders, 566 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 37, 50 (1999) (finding that supernodes
"enjoy more positive job evaluations, faster promotions, and higher compensation"); Burt, 110
Am J Sociology at 354, 369-89 (cited in note 100) (adding that supernodes' ideas are evaluated
favorably within an organizational hierarchy).
141 See Tardy and Hale, 65 Commun Monographs at 353 (cited in note 100).
142 See Hansen, 44 Admin Sci Q at 82, 105 (cited in note 120) (examining the transfer of
information among department subunits in a company based on the type of information sought
to be transmitted).
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communicate with each other, no individual had enough information
to prevent the terrorist attacks from taking place.'
C. Network Structure
Not all social networks are equally effective at transmitting infor-
mation to their members. Network structure will reflect varying grada-
tions of scale-free structure, and those variances may well be determi-
native with respect to whether information revealed at one node of a
network makes its way to a distant node on the same network.'"
One critical structural variable is the prevalence of supernodes in
a network, and the social distance from those supernodes to the pe-
riphery. Under a "strength of weak ties" analysis, we can see that the
prevalence of supernodes who are weakly tied to multiple different
close-knit communities will play a substantial role in determining how
quickly and completely new information is disseminated through a
society. All else being equal, a society solely interested in the rapid
diffusion of stand-alone information will probably prefer for weak ties
to exist between supernodes, as opposed to between peripherals.
A second important structural variable is the extent of linkages in
society. Supernodes can have functioning weak ties with one hundred
people, or weak ties with two thousand people. The greater the num-
ber of active linkages a supernode has, the better information will flow
through a network. The same is true of a social network's peripherals,
and the "ordinary nodes" who fall somewhere in between supernodes
and peripherals. Ceteris paribus, better-linked nodes mean more in-
formation transmission.4 1 Indeed, this idea that links are essential is
143 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Staff Statement
No. 9: Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior
to 9/11,3-5, 8-10 (July 26, 2004); Philip Shenon and David Johnston, Threats and Responses: The
Inquiry, NY Times A17 (Oct 2, 2002) (reporting that the Department of Transportation and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service might have caught two 9/11 hijackers before the attacks
if their agencies had received information being shared elsewhere in the government). See also
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford 1962) (discussing the failure
of American intelligence and defense officials to connect the dots regarding the pending Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor).
144 Compare Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 Ala L Rev 231 (2004) (discussing the ability of entities to achieve optimal levels of
information sharing by examining competitors in network industries and finding that structural
problems within such a network prevent the achievement of optimal information transfer).
145 The extent to which all of a community's members are directly linked to each other is
referred to as the network's "density." So imagine a network with twenty people. If each of these
twenty people knows all nineteen of their fellow community members, then the network can be
described as having high density. If, on the other hand, each of these twenty people knows only
three or four of the other community members, then the network can be described as having low
density. Scott, Social Network Analysis at 32 (cited in note 119). For further discussion of various
measures of network structure, see Rowley, 22 Acad Mgmt Rev at 896-900 (cited in note 93).
[72:919
2005] A Social Networks Theory of Privacy
part of the basis. for Robert Putnam's influential argument that social
capital and robust associational activity help promote economic well-
being.'"
The need for concealment of network activities from outsiders
may also decrease the communicative efficiency of a social network.
When the information at issue is highly sensitive, perhaps because it
reflects illegal or politically disfavored motivations, network members
will have to be quite cautious about sharing information. In such cir-
cumstances, weak ties may become totally inactive, as individuals be-
gin sharing information only with well-trusted associates. Examples of
such networks include criminal conspiracies, networks of political op-
position in totalitarian regimes, and interaction networks in certain
singles bars. '
D. Cultural and Strategic Considerations in Sharing
Staying with the subject of concealment, sociological research
shows that certain kinds of information are inherently more likely to
be shared among members of a social network than other kinds of
information. The better empirical studies of information sharing in-
volve topics as diverse as HIV status, academic discipline, and bakery
closings. ' A brief discussion of these three studies will help contextu-
146 See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 319-25 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (describing the
decline of social capital in the United States and identifying social capital's impact on education,
safety, productivity, economic well-being, democracy, health, and happiness); Robert D. Putnam,
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 152-62 (Princeton 1993) (comparing
the wealth of social capital in northern Italy to the dearth of social capital in southern Italy and
using the discrepancy to explain the south's relative impoverishment).
147 See, for example, Rowley, 22 Acad Mgmt Rev at 903 (cited in note 93) (characterizing a
Colombian drug cartel's structure as centralized and low-density); Baker and Faulkner, 58 Am
Sociological Rev at 854 (cited in note 139) (finding that "the need to conceal overrides the need
for efficient coordination" in price-fixing conspiracies); Raymond A. Bauer and David B. Glei-
cher, Word-of-Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union, 17 Pub Op Q 297,309-10 (1953) (dis-
cussing the Soviet Union's attitude toward unofficial, unsanctioned word-of-mouth networks,
and the behavior of participants in these networks); Carol Brooks Gardner, Access Information:
Public Lies and Private Peril, 35 Soc Probs 384, 386-94 (1988) (discussing women's reluctance to
provide men with their correct names, addresses, and other identifying information in bars and
other public spaces).
148 Other interesting and pertinent empirical work includes Laurel Richardson's study of
sixty-five unmarried women who engaged in long-lasting adulterous relationships with married
men. Richardson, 53 Am Sociological Rev 209 (cited in note 8). Perhaps surprisingly, Richardson
found that none of the women ever publicly revealed their affairs, and that it never occurred to
them to do so. Id at 213-14. Moreover, many of the women curtailed their conversations with
third parties as a means of preventing themselves from "letting slip" information about their
involvement with married men. Id at 216. Mie Kito's recent paper on the self-disclosure of per-
sonal information among friends and lovers is also interesting. Kito, 145 J Soc Psychology 127
(cited in note 8). Kito found that American students shared more information with friends and
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alize the lessons that can be drawn from the empirical literature on
social networks.
1. HIV.
Courts often treat HIV-positive status as a presumptively private
fact. ' And yet, not surprisingly, virtually all people who are HIV posi-
tive disclose this information to at least some people.5' Gene Shelley
and coauthors interviewed a population of seventy HIV-positive peo-
ple to determine how widely information about them was known in
their social networks. "1'
This study revealed several interesting findings. First, there were
many facts about the interviewees that were less widely known by
friends, relatives, and acquaintances than their HIV status. HIV status
was more widely known within the interviewees' social networks than
their political party affiliation, their blood type, the presence or ab-
sence of a criminal record, their labor union membership, whether
their home had been broken into in the past year, their approximate
income, their religion, whether they had served in the military, the
most important problems in their households, major life events that
had happened during the last twelve months, whether they had ever
been shot or threatened with a gun, the amount of time they had lived
at their current address, where they had traveled during the past
lovers than Japanese students did and also found more disclosure by lovers than by friends. Id at
135-37.
A third study, by Loretta Stalans and Karyl Kinsey, looked at the information that audited
taxpayers spread through their social networks. Loretta J. Stalans and Karyl A. Kinsey, Self-
Presentation and Legal Socialization in Society:Available Messages About Personal Tax Audits, 28
L & Socy Rev 859 (1994). Most people who were audited did talk to others about the experience,
and nearly one in four people talked to more than eleven people about the audit. Id at 874.
Auditees were most likely to talk to family members, then friends or neighbors, then coworkers.
Id. Stalans and Kinsey concluded that, for the most part, "stories about personal experiences that
spread through social networks often provide a fair representation of the audit process and serve
to correct media portrayal of auditors as primarily rude, punitive, and unfair." Id at 889-90. There
were, however, some distortions: where auditees felt their integrity had been attacked during the
audit process, or where they had been treated rudely but received favorable outcomes (that is, no
increased tax liability), they were quite likely to discuss the incompetence of the auditors and the
slowness of the process with members of their social networks. Id at 878-79, 890. As a result,
messages reflecting rude treatment and auditor incompetence were overrepresented in network
communications, while polite treatment and auditor competence were underrepresented.
149 See, for example, Doe v High-Tech Institute, 972 P2d 1060, 1070 (Colo App 1998) (find-
ing that a diagnosis of HIV is "unquestionably very highly sensitive"); Kubach, 443 SE2d at 495;
Urbaniak v Newton, 226 Cal App 3d 1128,277 Cal Rptr 354, 360 (1991) (stating that HIV status
"is clearly a 'private fact"').
150 See Gene A. Shelley, et al, Who Knows Your H1V Status? What HIV+ Patients and Their
Network Members Know About Each Other, 17 Soc Networks 189, 211 (1995).
151 Id at 189.
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twelve months, and several other facts. ' There were relatively few
facts about the interviewees that were more widely known than their
HIV status: just their sexual preference, their real first name, whether
they used illegal drugs, their number of children, their address, their
birthplace, their age, their marital status, their work status, and their
occupation. ' To be sure, someone's HIV status may be more pertinent
than his blood type, and hence an individual may have more acquaint-
ances who "need to know" his HIV status, but this data still suggests
that people's HIV-positive status is not a terribly closely guarded se-
cret.
Second, the researchers found strong evidence of selective disclo-
sure within the social networks of HIV-positive individuals. Interview-
ees were much more likely to have disclosed their HIV status to
members of organized support groups than to their relatives and
friends."' Indeed, a number of HIV-positive interviewees reported that
they were reluctant to tell relatives, close friends, and even sexual
partners about their HIV-positive status because of the fear of stigma-
tization, abandonment, homophobia, job loss, or violence."' Disclosing
HIV status to support group members, many of whom were them-
selves HIV positive, was seen as less threatening."' Reciprocity safe-
guarded the disclosures. Other studies of selective disclosure have
found similar results in varied contexts.'7 There is a critical finding
implicit in this data, although Shelley and his coauthors did not high-
light it: HIV-positive individuals disclosed their status to some mem-
bers of their social networks while successfully keeping other mem-
bers of their networks from discovering the information. Disclosure to
a support group member did not make disclosure to other friends or
relatives inevitable, even though those kept in the dark might have
been highly interested in learning about the interviewees' HIV
status."
152 Id at 203. At least seventeen facts about the interviewees were less widely known than
their HIV status; approximately two facts were as widely known (health status and education
level). Id.
153 Id.
154 Id at 203-04.
155 Id at 194,204-13.
156 Id at 204.
157 See, for example, Leslie A. Baxter and Sally Widenmann, Revealing and Not Revealing
the Status of Romantic Relationships to Social Networks, 10 J Soc & Personal Relationships 321,
331 (1993) (finding that individuals were much more likely to conceal their romantic involve-
ments from their parents than from their friends).
158 There is evidence suggesting that closeted homosexuals consciously go to great lengths
to make sure that the parts of their social networks that know their sexual orientation do not
intersect with the parts of their social networks that assume they are heterosexual. See Peter
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Third, the researchers discovered that HIV-positive individuals
had unusually small social networks."' There were several factors con-
tributing to this lack of links: some HIV-positive individuals were
shunned by former friends and relatives; some withdrew from former
friends and relatives as a way of sparing them the pain of death; many
had seen their social networks shrink because of HIV-related mortal-
ity; and most interviewees were no longer working, which removed
them from employment-related social networks.'" Moreover, the HIV-
positive people interviewed tended to behave like economically dis-
advantaged people -they withdrew into small, close-knit communities
comprised mostly of other HIV-positive individuals, cutting off many
weak ties with the outside world.6 '
2. Girls' school gossip.
A second important study of information networks predates the
advent of social networks theory. In the mid-1950s, Stanley Schachter
and Harvey Burdick studied the flow of gossip through a school for
girls.'6 The researchers had teachers publicly remove one student from
each of four classrooms, explaining out loud that the student would be
gone for the rest of the day.'6' In the remaining classrooms at the
school, no students were removed. The researchers then planted a ru-
mor about the explanation for the students' removal with four student
confederates, two of whom were in classes from which a student had
been removed. A few hours later, following lunch and recess, all the
girls in the school were interviewed to gauge what they had heard
about the reasons for the four girls' removal.
The researchers reported several interesting findings. First, all but
one of the ninety-six girls interviewed had heard the rumor in ques-
Davies, The Role of Disclosure in Coming Out Among Gay Men, in Ken Plummer, ed, Modern
Homosexualities: Fragments of Lesbian and Gay Experience 75-81 (Routledge 1992).
159 See Shelley, et al, 17 Soc Networks at 200 (cited in note 150). See also William Craig
Carter, Social Networks and Stigmatization 14-19, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University (2000) (available from UMI Dissertation Services, Microform No 9984316)
(finding that HIV-positive people, along with other stigmatized individuals, have smaller social
networks).
160 See Shelley, et al, 17 Soc Networks at 194,200,213-14 (cited in note 150).
161 Id at 213-14. See also text accompanying notes 128-29. Indeed, this correlation is not
surprising, since so many of the HIV-positive individuals interviewed were poor. See id at 194
(calculating that the HIV-positive interviewees had an average income of $8,674, but noting that
the study's methodology "probably eliminated access to some more affluent [interviewees]").
162 Stanley Schachter and Harvey Burdick, A Field Experiment on Rumor Transmission and
Distortion, 50 J Abnormal & Soc Psychology 363 (1955). For a review of the Schachter and Bur-
dick studies, as well as several other early studies of rumor transmission, see H. Taylor Buckner,
A Theory of Rumor Transmission, 29 Pub Op Q 54,65-70 (1965).
163 Schachter and Burdick, 50 J Abnormal & Soc Psychology at 365 (cited in note 162).
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tion. ' Second, girls from whose classes a student was removed passed
along the rumor to a significantly greater number of students, and
spent more time discussing the rumor, than did those girls whose
classes witnessed no disruption that morning. '6 Schachter and Burdick
concluded on the basis of this data that there were far stronger incen-
tives to discuss and transmit the rumor "when the issue to which it is
relevant is important" to the audience and/or speaker.6 Third, the
planted rumor was not distorted substantially as it passed through the
school's social network.1 67 The story that the girls told the interviewers
was essentially the same story that the researchers had planted that
morning. Fourth, although the planted rumor survived intact, non-
planted alternative stories to explain the girls' removal also circulated.
Approximately twelve alternative rumors relating to the girls' re-
moval circulated through the school.'6 Students in classes that had
witnessed a removal were much more likely to concoct new rumors
and to discuss them with peers.'69 Moreover, students who were friends
of the removed students tended to circulate rumors that cast them in a
favorable light (for example, "she's receiving an award"), while stu-
dents who were not friendly with the removed students circulated ru-
mors that cast them in a negative light (for example, "she broke school
rules and is being disciplined").'70
3. Hong Kong bakeries.
A third study, by Gina Lai and Odalia Wong, looked at the spread
of an untrue rumor through Hong Kong.' The somewhat whimsical
164 Id at 366.
165 Id at 368.
166 Id. See also Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control at 48 (cited in note 8).
167 Schachter and Burdick, 50 J Abnormal & Soc Psychology at 370 (cited in note 162).
168 Id at 369.
169 Id.
170 Id at 369-70. Related studies suggest that people would be more likely to spread nega-
tive rumors about a girl to groups of students who had negative impressions of her, and positive
rumors to students who had favorable impressions of her. See E. Tory Higgins, Achieving "Shared
Reality" in the Communication Game: A Social Action that Creates Meaning, 11 J Language &
Soc Psychology 107, 113-17 (1992). See also Charles Stangor, Gretchen B. Sechrist, and John T.
Yost, Changing Racial Beliefs by Providing Consensus Information, 27 Personality & Soc Psy-
chology Bull 486,493 (2001) (concluding that "personal endorsement of racial beliefs is affected
by perceptions about the extent to which those beliefs are shared by others"). There may have
been a second-order effect here, too, since people generally believe rumors whose truth they
want to believe. Buckner, 29 Pub Op Q at 57 (cited in note 162). See also Gambetta, 35 Archives
Europ6ennes de Sociologie at 211 (cited in note 8) ("A convincing story gets repeated because of
its appeal not its truthfulness.").
171 Gina Lai and Odalia Wong, The Tie Effect on Information Dissemination: The Spread of
a Commercial Rumor in Hong Kong, 24 Soc Networks 49 (2002). The run on baked goods that
Lai and Wong describe is in many ways similar to standard runs on bank funds or currencies. See,
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episode, and the data that Lai and Wong obtained about how the tale
spread, revealed a great deal about how information gets transmitted
through large, complicated social networks.
On November 24, 1997, several workers at a Hong Kong bakery
chain saw fellow employees receiving layoff notices and evidently
concluded that the chain was going bankrupt.7 ' This belief was plausi-
ble enough, since during that same year a department store with
which the bakery chain was previously affiliated had declared bank-
ruptcy and closed all its stores. 317 In any event, the bakery shutdowns
would have affected many consumers, as it is apparently common in
Hong Kong for people to exchange bakery vouchers, which can be
redeemed for baked goods.'74 With thousands of bakery vouchers in
circulation, the rumor caused Hong Kong residents to rush to the bak-
eries, trying to redeem their vouchers before the stores closed. Within
a few hours of the rumor's origination,
thousands of Hong Kong people, upon hearing the news, brought
all their vouchers (ranging from one to dozens) and rushed to the
shops.... [T]hey pushed and squeezed into the shops and got
whatever cakes or pastries [were] left. When all the cakes and
pastries in the shops were taken, many people would even wait
for hours outside the shops for new batches to come out. To calm
down this mass hysteria, the [bakery] immediately made public
announcements to clear the rumor in that evening. However,
there were still people coming to the shops to redeem their
vouchers the next day.'
The rumor was totally unfounded, and yet it caused a complete break-
down in the generally orderly Hong Kong market for pastries.
Luckily, something good came out of the disturbance, as sociolo-
gists Lai and Wong were able to launch a telephone poll of 1,011 re-
spondents within a week of the event, asking Hong Kong residents
how they learned about the rumor. By that time, more than 90 percent
of the respondents had heard of the rumor. 6 Lai and Wong's data
provides the most detailed analysis to date of how a rumor spreads
for example, Barrie A. Wigmore, Was the Bank Holiday of 1933 Caused by a Run on the Dollar?,
47 J Econ Hist 739, 754 (1987). For another good study on rumor transmission in mass society,
see generally J.N. Kapferer, A Mass Poisoning Rumor in Europe, 53 Pub Op Q 467 (1989) (re-
searching the transmission of a persistent European rumor accusing ten well-known brands of
food products of being toxic and/or carcinogenic).
172 Lai and Wong, 24 Soc Networks at 54 (cited in note 171).
173 Id at 53.
174 Id at 54.
175 Id (internal citations omitted).
176 Id at 56-58.
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through an urbanized society. I'll focus on a few of their more interest-
ing findings.
First, informal social networks seem to have been vital in spread-
ing the information. Many people heard about the rumor before it was
reported in the mass media, and personal ties were the second most
common source for hearing about the rumor (after television). "
Second, only 30 percent of those who heard the information
through personal ties passed the information on to others." This sug-
gests a tendency for information to degrade as it passes through a
network. It will degrade in a predictable manner, not a random man-
ner: people will pass along a rumor that they have heard if they per-
ceive it to be new and nonredundant, interesting to the relevant audi-
ence, and credible. The Hong Kong data also suggests that there can
be an opportunity cost of passing along new information-in this case,
slowing down one's dash to the bakery and increasing the odds of en-
countering a longer line upon one's arrival. Social networks thus func-
tion somewhat differently from the communications network associ-
ated with the childhood game "Telephone." Each player can choose
whether or not to pass along the information to the next player, and
we can expect that many rumors will never make their way through
the entire social network. "9
Third, people tended to spread the rumor to members of their
networks who they believed would benefit the most from the informa-
tion. ° Thus, those surveyed were more likely to spread the information
to people who they thought owned bakery vouchers."' Because the
vouchers are frequently given as gifts, we might have expected reasona-
bly high levels of awareness with respect to whether close associates
might have vouchers. Moreover, because the information concerned
177 More than 60 percent of respondents heard the news from television sources, versus
approximately 42 percent who heard it from personal ties. Television was the exclusive informa-
tion source for roughly 24 percent of respondents, whereas word of mouth was the exclusive
information source for 16 percent of respondents. Id at 58, 59 table 3.
178 Id at 59. In another study involving a rumor that a common food additive was toxic,
slightly more than half the people who heard the rumor reported passing it along to one or more
people. Kapferer, 53 Pub Op Q at 476 table 5 (cited in note 171). The most common response
was discussing the rumor with other persons or showing others the leaflet on which the rumor
circulated. Id.
179 Although Schachter and Burdick's rumor did spread to almost all of the girls at the
school, the authors noted that this result was anomalous, driven to a substantial extent by the
mysterious, unprecedented, and highly salient removal of four girls from classes for unspecified
reasons. Schachter and Burdick, 50 J Abnormal & Soc Psychology at 365,368 (cited in note 162).
Schachter and Burdick noted that in the vast majority of previous experimental studies of rumor
transmission, the planted rumor barely spread through the studied population. Id at 363--64.
180 See Lai and Wong, 24 Soc Networks at 62 (cited in note 171). See also Kimmel, Rumors
and Rumor Control at 94 (cited in note 8); Buckner, 29 Pub Op Q at 64-65 (cited in note 162).
181 Lai and Wong, 24 Soc Networks at 62 (cited in note 171).
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shopping for food, which is predominantly done by women in Hong
Kong, people were more likely to tell females about the rumor. '
Fourth, those interviewed played some role in redirecting the in-
formation from weaker ties to stronger ties. Whereas more than 74
percent of interviewees heard the news from non-kin (typically co-
workers), those interviewed passed the information on to a group that
was composed of 45 percent kin and 55 percent non-kin. To the ex-
tent that kinship is a proxy for strong ties, this suggests that most peo-
ple were more highly motivated to spread the potentially valuable
information to those whose relationships they valued the most.' Fur-
ther data backed up this assessment. Among those who heard the in-
formation through personal ties, 34 percent described their relation-
ships with the informants as "very good," 24 percent described them
as "good," and 41 percent described the relationships as "fair." But
those surveyed redirected the information to a different population:
52 percent of those who the respondents informed of the rumor had
"very good" relationships with the respondents, 22 percent had "good"
relationships, and only 26 percent had "fair" relationships.
Finally, the source of the information mattered-both the original
source and the identity of the immediate informant.6 The rumor ap-
peared to spread quickly, in part, because it was reported to have
originated inside the company. And it also spread quickly because the
rumor was passed on by people who had an incentive to be truthful-
the sampled population was more likely to pass it along to people they
cared about, and we know from other studies that information trans-
mitted through strong ties tends to be more persuasive and influential
than information transmitted through less reputable sources.187
182 Id at 62-63 (finding that 71.4 percent of those spreading the rumor and 65 percent of
those being contacted about the rumor were female).
183 Id at 67. This data suggests that a relatively small number of supernodes, mostly in
workplaces, passed along the information to very large numbers of people. Thus, it appears that
the communications network at issue here was scale-free.
184 Other social network studies have suggested that in times of crisis, or extreme need,
people are much more likely to rely on strong ties, especially kinship ties, than weak ties. Yossi
Shavit, Claude S. Fischer, and Yael Koresh, Kin and Nonkin Under Collective Threat: Israeli
Networks During the Gulf War, 72 Soc Forces 1197, 1208-09 (1994).
185 Lai and Wong, 24 Soc Networks at 68 (cited in note 171).
186 See id at 54. See also Kapferer, 53 Pub Op 0 at 478 (cited in note 171) (noting that tying
a rumor to a credible source increases the likelihood of its transmission); Buckner, 29 Pub Op Q
at 56 (cited in note 162) (same).
187 Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control at 56 (cited in note 8); Ibarra and Andrews, 38
Admin Sci Q at 282 (cited in note 111).
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E. Interaction Between Structure and Culture
Synthesizing these insights about structure and culture can pro-
duce new insights that apply to information dissemination. For exam-
ple, structure and culture combine to make it exceptionally unlikely
that information about a private figure will be interesting beyond two
degrees of separation. Duncan Watts notes that "anyone more distant
than a friend of a friend is, for all intents and purposes, a stranger....
[A]nything more than two degrees might as well be a thousand.""
Watts's argument that people have trouble seeing beyond two degrees
of separation is true, but it is also the case that, at least in the pre-
Friendster era, no one much cared about those people who were re-
moved from us by more than two links.'89
An illustration will be helpful: extramarital affairs are fascinating
events. That said, no self-respecting person would go to a cocktail
party and tell a private story about a friend of a friend of a friend who
is having an adulterous affair with someone unknown to the speaker
and listener. It is only if the speaker or listener knows who the adul-
terers are, or if the details of the affair are particularly sordid, humor-
ous, or memorable, that the information is likely to get disseminated
further through the social network."' And by the time the information
makes it through this chain, it seems likely that the participants' names
188 Watts, Six Degrees at 299-300 (cited in note 92). Diego Gambetta echoes this point in his
discussion of gossip:
If [an object of gossip] were unknown gossip would be meaningless. This requirement has
been widely acknowledged. "Known," however, should be taken to mean that [the object] is
relevant in some respect to both the transmitter and the receiver of gossip. They may not
know [the object] personally, but know, say, that they will soon meet [him]. We are at times
interested in the lives of persons we will never know personally, but only in so far as they
are friends of friends of friends. The more remote the link with [the object], the more specu-
lative gossip's motives, which ultimately pale into a near-universal curiosity for human
quirks.
Gambetta, 35 Archives Europ~ennes de Sociologie at 205 (cited in note 8) (internal citations
omitted). This trend is a good thing, to the extent that we are concerned about the accuracy of
gossip and other forms of accurate information. With each retelling of a story to someone an
additional degree of separation from the subject, the story becomes increasingly inaccurate,
portraying the subject in an increasingly extreme manner. See Thomas Gilovich, Secondhand
Information and Social Judgment, 23 J Exp Soc Psychology 59, 69-74 (1987) (concluding that
secondhand impressions are generally more extreme than firsthand impressions, in either a
positive or negative direction depending on the positive or negative nature of the account).
189 Friendster is an internet-based program that produces maps of its members' social net-
works, facilitating networking among members. It has proved particularly popular as a dating
network, with individuals examining the profiles of their friends' friends for attractive matches.
See Friendster, online at http://www.friendster.com (visited May 16, 2005). Friendster's software
interface seems to invite efforts to map the social networks of one's friends and expand the size
of one's own social network by forging direct links with friends' friends.
190 See Allport and Postman, 10 Pub Op Q at 502-05, 512-14 (cited in note 139). See also
text accompanying notes 165-66,169-70.
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would have dropped out of the story."' Thus, when dealing with events
described via word of mouth, someone should have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy beyond two links in a social network. If A tells B
something private about A, and B tells C, and C tells supernode D,
who shares the information with the public, then A should have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy as against D, assuming that A has no
direct connections to either C or D.
This rule of thumb appears to hold less strongly when one moves
away from word-of-mouth communications. Indeed, the increased
prevalence of email, blogging, and other new forms of communica-
tions in recent decades has facilitated the more rapid dissemination of
new information and created new categories of potential supernodesln
Thus, particularly embarrassing emails or memoranda have on occa-
sion made their way around the world, even though few of the even-
tual recipients were familiar with the original parties to the communi-
cation."' The same is true of photographs or videos depicting privatescenes, such as nudity or sexual conduct.4That said, the percentage of
191 Id at 505. For a terrific study of how pertinent information gets dropped from a story as
it is sequentially retold by several individuals, see Anthony Lyons and Yoshihisa Kashima, The
Reproduction of Culture: Communication Processes Tend to Maintain Cultural Stereotypes, 19
Soc Cognition 372 (2001). Lyons and Kashima found that aspects of a story that reinforced exist-
ing stereotypes about athletes were more easily recalled, and hence more likely to be repeated as
the story passed through a chain of people, than stereotype-incompatible information, leading to
convergence between the contents of the story and the stereotype upon serial retelling. Id at
385-86. See also Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control at 91-93 (cited in note 8) (describing
more generally how rumors change when they are transmitted through multiple links in a social
network); Labianca, Brass, and Gray, 41 Acad Mgmt J at 64 (cited in note 129) (suggesting that
rumors tend to get exaggerated when they circulate in social networks).
192 See Kimmel, Rumors and Rumor Control at 205 (cited in note 8); Uwe Matzat, Aca-
demic Communication and Internet Discussion Groups: Transfer of Information or Creation of
Social Contacts?, 26 Soc Networks 221, 245-48 (2004) (analyzing the role of internet discussion
groups in informal academic communication and concluding that the weak contacts made in
these groups are useful for the reception of new research papers); Joel R. Reidenberg and Fran-
qoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 Wake
Forest L Rev 105, 119-20 (1995) (discussing the increase in information transmission and the
expansion of networks stemming from technological innovation).
193 See, for example, Jonathan D. Glater, Legal Research? Get Me Sushi, with Footnotes, NY
Times Al (Oct 22, 2003) (quoting from a now infamous research memo about the relative merits
of Manhattan sushi restaurants, prepared at the direction of an attorney at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP); The National Debate, Paul Kelly Tripplehorn, Jr., Your Fifteen Min-
utes Is Up (May 16, 2003), online at http://www.thenationaldebate.com/blogger/articles/
HutchisonlnternEmail.htm (visited May 16, 2005) (describing reactions to an infamous breakup
email sent from one Senate intern to another, and subsequently forwarded to thousands of peo-
ple); Shaun Waterman, Analysis: Click-Forward Morality, United Press International (Mar 3,
2003), online at http://www.upi.com/view.cfmn?StorylD=20030303-023031-9883r (visited May 16,
2005) (describing an off-the-record email that a journalist, Laurie Garrett, sent to a dozen
friends, which was subsequently forwarded around the world and dissected on various blogs).
194 See Ian Ith, Local Porn Business Tries to Stay Under Wraps; Hilton Tape Bringing Un-
wanted Attention, Seattle Times B1 (Nov 20, 2003) (describing the dissemination of an amateur
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emails that get forwarded beyond two degrees of separation from the
initial recipient must be so low as to render this risk the kind that a
prudent private figure should ignore.' Moreover, so many emails flow
into peoples' inboxes that the likelihood of any particular message
being singled out for widespread dissemination is usually negligible.
116
Noise has long been an important method of protecting privacy."
The presence of legal or moral constraints on subsequent disclo-
sure of information does (and ought to) inform a plaintiff's reasonable
expectation of privacy in particular information, too.'" Obviously, a
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the privileged in-
formation that he reveals to his attorney. Barring a malpractice suit,
the client can expect that the information will remain confidential. But
in certain cases, there will be no clearly established legal duty binding
the person to whom information is disclosed. Suppose a famous ac-
tress attends an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting and says, "Hello, My
name is Lara Flynn, and I'm an alcoholic.""', There are evidently no
legal or contractual constraints on the ability of those who attend Al-
coholics Anonymous meetings to disclose what they hear."' But Alco-
holics Anonymous participants apparently share deeply held social
norms barring the disclosure of information about attendees outside
sex tape featuring heiress Paris Hilton). Compare Lovisi v Slayton, 539 F2d 349, 350-51 (4th Cir
1976) (involving a sodomy prosecution of participants in a mrnage A trois, where the sex act
came to light after the daughter of a participant discovered Polaroid photographs depicting her
mother's sex acts and brought them into school).
195 This is different from being forwarded twice, which is more common. By two degrees of
separation, I mean that the recipient of a forwarded email knows neither the recipient, the
sender, nor anyone who knows the recipient or sender of the original email, nor anyone who
knows someone who knows the recipient or sender of the original email.
196 When information overload occurs, interesting information might not be identified as
such. As a result, information that would otherwise be passed along from one node to another
never gets transmitted and remains obscure. On information overload, see Kimmel, Rumors and
Rumor Control at 213 (cited in note 8).
197 Prior to the development of modern communications technologies, individuals wishing
to have a "private" conversation might have met in a private space, like a home, or a deserted
warehouse. Alternatively, they might have gone to a crowded pub, where the chatter of fellow
patrons created enough of a din to preclude effective eavesdropping.
198 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Secrets and Secretiveness: Patterns in the Fabric of the
Law?, 78 Cal L Rev 515,531 (1990) ("[B]reach of confidence [ ] clearly has teeth in that it affects
how cases are decided. When information is obtained through a confidential relationship, courts
allow disclosure only under extraordinary circumstances.").
199 The National Enquirer has reported on celebrity participation in Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings in the past. See, for example, Lara Flynn Boyle in Alcoholics Anonymous, Natl En-
quirer (Mar 20,2003).
200 See Bree Schonbrun, Comment, "In the Light of Reason and Experience": The Scope of
Evidentiary Privilege in the Self-Help Setting: Alcoholics Anonymous Examined, 25 Cardozo L
Rev 1203, 1227 n 124, 1237-38 (2004). Nor are communications within twelve-step groups privi-
leged. See, for example, Cox v Miller, 296 F3d 89 (2d Cir 2002) (holding that defendant's com-
munications to members of an Alcoholics Anonymous group are not privileged under New York
state law).
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of the group setting., If these norms are sufficiently powerful and
almost universally adhered to by those who attend Alcoholics
Anonymous, even where attendees are public figures, then the actress
ought to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed
information. In short, certain groups can be designed to trigger recip-
rocal nondisclosure, and people making germane disclosures within
these settings generally ought to expect that the information disclosed
will not circulate outside the group.
F. Predictive Social Networks Analysis
In 1977, H. Russell Bernard, Peter Killworth, and Lee Sailer ar-
ticulated a lofty goal for social networks analysis. They noted that a
useful theory of information diffusion "must be able to predict how
information flows through the system, how quickly it will go from
point A to point B, and how likely it is to be trapped in pockets and
loops." 2 M Twenty-eight years later, perfect predictability of information
diffusion has not been achieved. This literature still has quite a ways to
go, and would benefit from collaborative work that can shed light on
the legal applications of information diffusion and social networks
theories. That said, there are several lessons from the literature that
might help us predict with reasonable accuracy whether subsequent
dissemination will follow initial disclosure. More precisely, informa-
tion will or will not be disseminated through a social network depend-
ing on these factors:
The structure of a network
* Prevalence of ties and supernodes
* Mix of strong and weak ties
* Proximity of disclosure to a supernode
* Difficulty of aggregating complex information through
weak ties
* Concealment versus efficiency tradeoff in network struc-
ture
* Extent to which technologies used by members of a social
network facilitate or constrain information dissemination
201 See Cox, 296 F3d at 111-12; Schonbrun, Comment, 25 Cardozo L Rev at 1227 n 124
(cited in note 200).
202 H. Russell Bernard, Peter Killworth, and Lee Sailer, Summary of Research on Informant
Accuracy in Network Data, and on the Reverse Small World Problem, 4 Connections: Bull Intl
Network for Soc Network Analysis 11, 18 (1977).
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The cultural variables
* Differentials in willingness to disclose facts to particular
groups or types
* Presence of moral or legal constraints on disclosure
* Network participants' ability to know which information
other network members are likely to deem relevant
* Propensity of certain information to degrade as it passes
through a network
* Whether the information is of the type that is ordinarily
transmitted through strong or weak ties
Many of these variables will in turn depend on the nature of the
information itself. Stand-alone information is efficiently transmitted
through weak ties, but complex information cannot be aggregated and
analyzed effectively through weak ties. People try to pass along infor-
mation that will be particularly valuable to a recipient, based on their
own awareness of the recipient's traits. Information about bakery clos-
ings will flow toward people interested in that subject matter and away
from people unlikely to hold bakery vouchers. AIDS support group
members may feel morally bound to avoid disclosing a fellow mem-
ber's HIV-positive status to a stranger, but may disclose the informa-
tion freely upon learning that the stranger is himself HIV positive. In
short, structural and cultural factors alone make it impossible to judge
the ex ante likelihood of information transmission through a network
without knowing the content of the purportedly private information.
Interestingly, privacy doctrine essentially ignores the nature of the in-
formation itself in determining whether a plaintiff who has disclosed it
to some people retained a reasonable expectation of privacy."'
203 Recall that the foundational privacy tort-public disclosure of private facts-has four
elements: the defendant must (1) give publicity (2) to a matter concerning the private life of
another (3) that is not of legitimate concern to the public (that is, it is non-newsworthy), and the
disclosure must be (4) highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652D. Privacy law thus disaggregates the question of "privacy" from the question of whether
the information is "of legitimate concern to the public." But as the foregoing analysis suggests,
the privacy of facts and the public's interest in those facts are inherently connected. Information
that has been disclosed to at least one person is more likely to be disseminated further if mem-
bers of the public will be interested in the information. See text accompanying notes 165-166
and 180-81. If I tell you that I had a bowl of cereal for breakfast this morning, I can expect that
this information will not be disseminated further because it is so trivial that no normal person
would repeat it to others. If, on the other hand, I tell you that I watched Peter Singer eat bacon
for breakfast this morning, that information would be more likely to transmit itself through a
social network, because it would reflect the possible hypocrisy of a famous vegetarian and ani-
mal rights advocate.
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G. Lessons
We have seen that weak ties generally do a poor job of aggregat-
ing nonredundant information that is possessed by multiple nodes on
a network. Thus, instances in which scattered private information
about an individual is pieced together, and the aggregated information
is disclosed, can be expected to be rare. ' Where this information ag-
gregation occurs through multiple sources linked via weak ties, we can
write it off as a fluke that a reasonable person should have disre-
garded. By contrast, when scattered bits of private information exist
within a close-knit network of people linked by strong ties, aggrega-
tion of that information is much more likely, and the plaintiff's expec-
tation of privacy with respect to the aggregated information ought to
be low.
We also have seen that the more interesting a particular piece of
private information, the less likely it is to degrade as it passes through
a network. Thus, if private information involves a highly unusual or
surprising event, a well-known public figure, or relates to an important
current event or trend, it is more likely to be disseminated through a
network. Monica Lewinsky can expect greater privacy in her revela-
tion to Linda Tripp that she is having an affair with Joe Schmo than
she should in her revelation that she is having an affair with the
President of the United States. Relatedly, once interesting information
There is a dispute among the courts with respect to the meaning of the "not of legitimate
concern to the public" prong of the public disclosure tort. Is this element descriptive? Or is it
normative? Are courts asking what the public is likely to find interesting? Or are courts asking
what information the public has the right to know? See Solove and Rotenberg, Information
Privacy Law at 107-10 (cited in note 89); Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the
Public Disclosure Tort, 85 Ky L J 147, 157-64 (1996-1997) (examining existing methods in aca-
demic literature and case law used to determine the newsworthiness of private information). The
privacy case law splits on this question, with some courts deferring to news media defendants'
judgments about what information is newsworthy, see, for example, Neff v Time, Inc, 406 F Supp
858, 859, 862 (WD Pa 1976) (upholding publication of a photograph of a football fan with his
"fly" open as protected by the Constitution, even though the picture was taken without the fan's
express consent), and others holding that information is non-newsworthy, even though tens of
thousands of individuals are willing to pay substantial sums of money to obtain the information,
see, for example, Michaels v Internet Entertainment Group, 5 F Supp 2d 823,828-30,842 (CD Cal
1998) (issuing a preliminary injunction prohibiting the dissemination of a sex tape in order to
prevent a violation of the plaintiffs right of privacy despite large public interest in the tape). In
my view, courts should ask both questions. They should ask whether the public is interested in
this information as part of the determination of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expecta-
tion that the information would remain private, and they should ask whether the public ought to
be entitled to see the information under the "legitimate concern to the public" prong of the
public disclosure tort.
204 This discussion applies to information that has been transmitted through face-to-face
interactions or telephone conversations. When information is communicated via the internet or
other archived communications media, new technologies like Google might make aggregation of
scattered information a relatively simple matter.
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reaches a supernode, the supernode is more likely to deem the infor-
mation worth sharing with her many contacts. And information that
can be traced to an inherently credible source, such as a bakery em-
ployee at a store rumored to be closing, is also more likely to be dis-
seminated through a network by people seeking to help out their
peers. As a general matter, then, a plaintiff ought to expect that if he
discloses previously private information that is likely to be regarded
as highly interesting, novel, revealing, or entertaining, that information
is rather likely to be disseminated. And, as in most privacy cases,
where it is the plaintiff who has made the initial disclosure of damag-
ing information, 25 the plaintiff ought to understand that his involve-
ment at the story's origin made it more likely that the story would
spread .'0,
IV. READING THE CASE LAW IN LIGHT OF
SOCIAL NETWORKS THEORY
Let us return to the tort law discussed in Part II. Some opinions
hold that because the plaintiff has disclosed the information to a few
people, she can no longer recover on the basis of a subsequent disclo-
sure. Most opinions reach a contrary result, holding that a limited dis-
closure of private information by the plaintiff doesn't necessarily ren-
der that information "public" for the purposes of the privacy torts.
There is, in short, substantial uncertainty with respect to how much
disclosure can occur before the information becomes "public." Judges
appear to be applying an ad hoc, "I know it when I see it" standard to
reasonable expectations of privacy. This raises the natural question of
how well courts' intuitive judgments comport with the social networks
findings discussed in the previous section. This Part addresses that
question.
Before I do that, let me say a few words about what it means for
something to become "public." In the cases that follow, I will assess
publicity as the likelihood of the previously private information at
issue reaching the people from whom the plaintiff would like to keep
it. In some cases, like Kubach, that means people who have no rela-
205 But not all. There are privacy cases in which the source of the information about an
individual is a third party, not the plaintiff. Indeed, in some instances, third parties such as credit
reporting agencies, health care providers, employers, or educators may have access to informa-
tion about the plaintiff that he himself does not have. For example, an employer might improp-
erly disclose to a third party confidential employment evaluations that the plaintiff has never
seen.
206 Compare Runge and Archer, 44 Soc Psychology Q at 360 (cited in note 8) (noting that
people assume that individuals are somewhat less likely to disclose private negative information
about themselves than private positive information about themselves).
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tionship to the plaintiff. In other cases, like Fisher, that means people
who have strong ties to the plaintiff. So at what point has a fact
crossed over from private to public? Surely the test for public infor-
mation cannot be whether a majority of the American public is aware
of the information.2°
Perhaps social networks theory can be used to provide a more at-
tractive answer. One preoccupation of social networks theorists has
been to determine the size of an individual's social network. Although
the studies vary somewhat, it appears that the median adult has met or
otherwise interacted with approximately 1,700 people. This does not
mean that the average person has 1,700 active ties, but rather that he
"knows" roughly this number of people.
We can use this 1,700-person threshold to establish the most lib-
eral acceptable definition for public facts. If a fact about me is known
by everyone with whom I am acquainted, as well as a few people with
whom I am not acquainted, then that fact must be public under any
meaningful conception of publicity. If, on the other hand, a particular
fact is known by my friends, but not by any strangers, then I might
argue that I retain an expectation of limited privacy in it. To determine
whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in informa-
tion, we therefore might evaluate the possibility that the information
will be disseminated to a number of people that exceeds the size of his
social network. If there is a low risk of such dissemination (for ex-
ample, lower than 5 percent), the courts can recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
The idea behind this approach, in short, is to assume that a plain-
tiff had perfect information about the risks of various outcomes at the
time of his initial disclosure, and then assess whether those risks were
sufficiently remote to justify the plaintiff's decision to disregard them.
We assume that the plaintiff is fully informed about what might hap-
pen, but not about what will happen. We then use this calculus to
evaluate whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to proceed with
the disclosure and assume that the information would remain ob-
207 If that were the test, then facts such as the identity of the House minority leader or the
capital of Canada would be deemed private with respect to the United States population.
208 Peter D. Killworth, et al, Estimating the Size of Personal Networks, 12 Soc Networks 289,
310 (1990) (offering the margin of error on this estimate at (+/-) 400). See also Peter D. Kill-
worth, et al, Two Interpretations of Reports of Subpopulation Sizes, 25 Soc Networks 141 (2003).
209 Most states hold that public disclosure of private facts requires the defendant to give
widespread publicity to the facts in question. In most states, and under the Restatement, disclo-
sure to a small group is not generally tortious, even if that small group has a special relationship
with the plaintiff. A few states disagree. See Solove and Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law at
98-101 (cited in note 89).
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scure."O Because social networks tend to be scale-free, this analysis
should often direct our attention to the proximity of a disclosure to a
supernode. Widespread dissemination frequently will depend on the
ex ante likelihood of particular information reaching a supernode and
being disseminated further via that supernode.
Disclosure to a supernode will not only increase the number of
people who will be exposed to the information at issue. It will also
enhance the likelihood that the information will "jump" across a struc-
tural hole that otherwise separates two distinct subnetworks. Through
supernode activities, information that the plaintiff did not mind shar-
ing with members of his twelve-step group might find its way into a
network of dentists, professors, secretaries, or-worst of all-tabloid
reporters. In a tort suit, courts are always called upon to examine cau-
sation: would the plaintiff have been harmed in the absence of the
defendant's actions? Social networks theory provides a basis for
evaluating that question when the plaintiffs injury stems from dis-
semination of previously private information. Courts simply need to
ask themselves: was the widespread dissemination of this information
inevitable, or did the defendant's actions materially affect the extent
of subsequent disclosure?
A. Evaluating the Leading Cases
Recall that Sanders involved a conversation between two co-
workers, within earshot of other coworkers at a telephone psychic
211business. The problem, from the plaintiffs perspective, was that
Lescht, one of the coworkers involved in the conversation, was actu-
ally an undercover journalist. There was an obvious dispute in this
case about whether the communication between Sanders and Lescht
was consensual and, as I suggested in Part I, social networks theory
provides little direct help there."' Sanders might well argue that the
210 This analysis should apply to the plaintiff's conduct taken as a whole, not to a specific
instance of disclosure. Thus, assume that there is a 1 percent chance of widespread dissemination
every time Bill tells someone about his extramarital affair with Monica. If Bill tells only one
friend about the affair, he might well have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the informa-
tion. But if Bill tells one hundred friends about the affair, he should not expect that the informa-
tion will remain private.
211 85 Cal Rptr 2d at 912. For a full discussion of Sanders, see text accompanying notes 47-52.
212 For interesting discussions of these issues involving undercover journalists, compare
Dietemann v Time, Inc, 449 F2d 245, 249 (9th Cir 1971) (recognizing an expectation of privacy),
with Desnick v ABC, 44 F3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir 1995) (refusing to recognize an expectation of
privacy).
Social networks analysis may have something to contribute to this analysis. We are generally
better able to determine whether someone is a supernode or peripheral if he is closely tied to us
than if he is weakly tied to us. Bondonio, 20 Soc Networks at 301 (cited in note 100). One could
argue, therefore, that if the discloser and disclosee are closely tied, the disclosee's actual status as
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journalist's misrepresentations elicited from him information that he
would have never revealed otherwise. And, of course, had Sanders
known he was being interviewed on the record by a journalist produc-
ing a news clip, then he could not possibly have had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the information he revealed. A journalist,
working in her employment capacity, is the most extreme version of a
supernode, weakly tied to all her readers, viewers, or listeners.
Social networks theory remains pertinent, however, because ABC
defended its reporter's actions by arguing that as a matter of law what
was said within earshot of fellow employees could not have been pri-
vate. According to the court, Sanders told Lescht about "his personal
aspirations and beliefs and gave Lescht a psychic reading., 213 This is
rather vague, but secondary media reports suggested that ABC broad-
cast a six-second clip of Sanders stating that he had previously worked
as a stand-up comedian and implying that he was not a particularly
motivated telepsychic. Suppose five or ten coworkers overheard
these statements. The odds of them disseminating the information to
others were rather low, and the odds of this information being dis-
seminated beyond the circle of people who knew Sanders personally
were essentially nil. Even if this stand-alone information had reached
a supernode, no self-respecting supernode would risk the ire of her
weak contacts by passing along such trivial information about a pri-
vate figure."' It is unsurprising that some telephone psychics are skep-
tical about the soothsaying enterprise, and the fact that one obscure
psychic previously worked as a comedian borders on the inane. In
holding that the presence of coworkers did not render the communi-
cation public, the Sanders court reached a result that is both intuitive
216
and consistent with the social science.
a supernode or peripheral ought to be determinative. If, by contrast, they are weakly tied, and if
society wants to encourage communication between weakly tied individuals, then the discloser
was entitled to rely on the disclosee's statement that he was an ordinary telephone psychic
(likely to be a peripheral) and not a journalist (a supernode by definition).
213 Sanders, 85 Cal Rptr 2d at 912.
214 See Jane Kirtley, Cracking Down on Covert Media Taping, Am Journalism Rev (Sept
1999), online at http://www.ajr.org/article.aspid=3198 (visited May 16,2005).
215 ABC broadcast the information only because it lent color to a more substantive news
story about scams within the telephone psychic industry. ABC never would have broadcast this
clip as the basis for a stand-alone news piece, especially not during February, when the piece
aired. (February is a Nielsen sweeps month.)
216 The primary California case delineating the limits of limited privacy seems to have been
rightly decided under networks theory, too. In Sipple v Chronicle Publishing Co, 154 Cal App 3d
1040,201 Cal Rptr 665 (1984), discussed in note 53, the court implicitly held that once hundreds
of homosexuals in several cities knew of Sipple's sexual orientation, and once Sipple's heroic
actions to thwart the attempt on President Ford's life thrust him into the national limelight, then
it was inevitable that Sipple's orientation would spread from the social network of homosexuals
to the social network of heterosexuals. See id at 668-70. This analysis is convincing, and we might
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Multimedia WMAZ, Inc v Kubach raised the more difficult ques-
tion of whether an individual's disclosure of his HIV status to sixty
friends, relatives, support group members, and healthcare profession-
als rendered that information public for the purposes of privacy law.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the information remained
private."' Obviously, much of the disclosure to healthcare providers
would be protected by a doctor-patient privilege, duties of confidenti-
ality, and substantive regulations such as the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act,28 and so these disclosures would hardly
render the information public. But what about nonprivileged disclo-
sures to friends, relatives, and support group members? The Shelley
study of HIV disclosure suggests that information about HIV status is
frequently shared with some parts of an individual's social network,
while other members, who might know the HIV-positive person well
and be interested in her health status, remain in the dark.19 Informa-
tion about HIV status, therefore, seems not to flow through social
networks readily, at least in the case of private figures.=0 Although this
particular fact was far more interesting, inherently, than the facts at
issue in Sanders, and although the information was again stand-alone,
Kubach had a reasonable expectation that his disclosure to some peo-
ple who knew him would not result in the information being revealed
to others who knew him, let alone thousands of people in his local
community. ' So the court got this harder case right too.
It is less obvious whether the court reached the right result in
YG. v Jewish Hospital. Again, set aside the consent issue of whether
the plaintiffs could have done more to avoid being filmed. The plain-
tiffs went to a party attended by similarly situated couples in their
local community, and were horrified when their attendance became
known to members of their church and the husband's coworkers. The
defendants argued that by going to this large party with forty atten-
further expect that the "mainstreaming" of homosexuality since 1984 has increased the number
and intensity of links between homosexuals and heterosexuals. For empirical analysis of network
ties between gays and straights, see generally William Edward Wagner, III, Identity Management
and the Social Networks of Gay Professional Men, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois at Chicago (2002) (available from UMI Dissertation Services, Microform No 3074178).
217 443 SE2d at 494. For a full discussion of Kubach, see text accompanying notes 65-70.
218 Pub L No 104-91, 110 Stat 1936 (1996), codified at 42 USC § 201 (1996) (establishing
administrative requirements, including security and privacy provisions, for health care services).
The Act is better known by its acronym, HIPAA.
219 See text accompanying notes 157-58.
220 The same may be true of celebrities. See Barbara Liss, The Public and Private Rock: Two
Views of the Late Star, Houston Chron 15 (July 13, 1986) (suggesting that Rock Hudson's limited
disclosure of his previously private HIV status just two months before his death was not in-
tended for the public at large).
221 See Kubach, 443 SE2d at 494.
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dees, the plaintiffs lost any expectation that their participation would
remain private."m
Evaluating this claim is difficult, especially since there has not
been an empirical study similar to the Shelley study conducted to dis-
cern knowledge of in vitro fertilization participation within the cou-
ple's social network. So we will have to extrapolate from what we do
know. The YG. plaintiffs' participation in the program, combined with
their membership in a church that condemned in vitro fertilization,
amounted to complex information. Such information would be
unlikely to be aggregated via weak ties. Hence, if the plaintiffs went to
the party and disclosed to no one there that they belonged to a church
that condemned in vitro fertilization, then they should have a rather
strong expectation of privacy. Moreover, the objections of that church
notwithstanding, there appears to be less stigma associated with in
vitro fertilization or infertility generally than there is with HIV-
positive status. The hospital's decision to invite a television crew to the
party, and the other attendees' evident lack of objection to its pres-
ence, provides at least weak inferential evidence in support of that
view. From this it follows that there would be fewer moral constraints
among the people at the party against subsequent disclosure but also
less interest in spreading that information. Moreover, anyone in at-
tendance at the party, other than the TV crew, would have been a
healthcare provider (with a duty of confidentiality) or a fellow par-
ticipant in the program. Fellow participants who belonged to the same
church, if any, would have been prevented from disclosing information
about the plaintiffs' participation to fellow church members by a fear
of symmetrical disclosure by the plaintiffs. At the same time, it appears
that the hospital was located in the plaintiffs' local community, and
their odds of being recognized by someone from their church or
workplaces were therefore heightened.
In short, the court's determination that the information was not
public is at least defensible, and probably right, but ideally the court
would have investigated (a) whether the plaintiffs' statements at the
party transformed previously complex information into stand-alone
information (that is, whether they disclosed both their identities and
their church's objections to the procedure); and (b) whether the plain-
tiffs spent much time talking to other party attendees and sharing
identifying information.
Duran, by contrast, is a case where the court's analysis cannot be
squared with social networks theory. Recall that Duran was a former
Colombian judge who had battled Pablo Escobar's drug cartel. Accord-
222 Id at 493. For a full discussion of YG., see text accompanying notes 58-64.
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ing to the court, Duran used her real name when shopping in stores or
eating in restaurants, which waived an expectation of privacy in her
identity.m Under a social networks theory approach, these acts, com-
bined with her notoriety in Colombia, would not have eliminated her
reasonable expectation of privacy in her identity. Shopping in a store
or eating in a restaurant involves weak-ties interactions. At most,
Duran would have come into fleeting contact with other customers or
service-sector employees. There was nothing interesting about Duran's
shopping or eating out. In order to generate interest in the story, the
defendant had to connect Duran's presence in Detroit to her past no-
toriety in Colombia and the bounty that had been placed on her head.
Such information was quite unlikely to be aggregated through the
kinds of weak ties that Duran established in Detroit's public spaces.
Perhaps a Colombian waiter would have put two and two together,
but this would have been a highly improbable turn of events. Duran's
general obscurity in Detroit properly engendered a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy with respect to her shopping and visiting restau-
rants. T2
Nader v General Motors presents a closer case. General Motors
was interested in obtaining information about Nader's sexual proclivi-
ties, political and religious beliefs, and views regarding race relations.m
Its agents therefore interviewed Nader's close friends and business
associates under false pretenses. These acts raised the question of
whether the interviews amounted to an intrusion upon Nader's seclu-
sion. The court found no intrusion upon seclusion, but it is difficult to
answer this legal question in the abstract. Nader was a public figure,
and so there was a heightened probability that information he re-
vealed to friends and associates eventually would have been disclosed
to the public at large.226 That said, the likelihood of disclosure would
depend on the extent to which the information at issue was interesting
or surprising, and the existence of any moral constraints on the disclo-
sure of such information. Simply put, one needs to know the details of
223 504 NW2d at 718. For a full discussion of Duran, see text accompanying notes 78-85.
224 Duran's disclosure to her neighbors that she had been threatened by drug dealers, how-
ever, may be a different story. Particularly given the size of the bounty at issue, one wonders
whether the dissemination of Duran's identity (if not to the public at large, then at least to
Escobar's cartel) became rather probable if she shared with her neighbors a detailed account of
her tribulations. Unfortunately, the court's opinion is quite vague with respect to the details of
these disclosures.
225 255 NE 2d at 767. For a full discussion of Nader, see text accompanying notes 71-77.
226 Statements that would be unremarkable if uttered by a private figure can be remarkable
if uttered by a public figure. An office worker's use of an expletive is totally unremarkable, but
the vice president's use of the same word is front-page news in the paper of record. See Richard
W. Stevenson, Cheney Owns Up to Profanity Incident and Says He "Felt Better Afterwards," NY
Tunes Al (June 26,2004).
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Nader's sexual proclivities, political and religious beliefs, and racial
attitudes in order to determine whether he possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy against subsequent disclosure of them to third
parties.
Social networks theory even helps us understand the numerically
puzzling result in Fisher v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Cor-
rection, where the plaintiff's disclosure of information to four cowork-
ers rendered it nonprivate as a matter of law. Recall that the informa-
tion at issue there involved sexually charged encounters between a
mother and her seven-year-old son. 7 At least in the United States,
such information is so inflammatory that it is unlikely to remain bot-
tled up in an office environment that includes large numbers of strong
ties. In most American workplaces, people tend to meet their cowork-
ers' spouses. Given the likelihood of at least weak ties between office
workers and the plaintiff's husband, disclosure to him was probable, if
not inevitable. While additional facts about the relationships among
Fisher, her former spouse, and her coworkers would have been helpful,
the court's categorical determination is defensible in light of the sala-
ciousness and possible illegality reflected in the plaintiff's disclosures.
B. Judges or Juries?
In the cases discussed above, appellate court judges examined
whether the plaintiff's disclosure of previously private information
rendered that information public as a matter of law. In cases where a
trial court had answered that question in the affirmative, the plaintiff's
privacy claims were dismissed. But in those cases where the trial court
had answered that question in the negative, the plaintiff's privacy
claims were submitted to the finder of fact. Essentially, the trial judges
were holding that the information at issue could be private, and letting
the jury decide whether it was in fact private.
In both Sanders and Kubach, juries ultimately found that the de-
fendants had publicized private information. The Sanders jury awarded
the plaintiff $635,000,m and the Kubach jury awarded the plaintiff
$500,000 in compensatory damages and $100 in punitive damages. "2
Thus, the jurors' conception of privacy tracked the results that are con-
227 See 578 NE2d 901. For a full discussion of Fisher, see text accompanying notes 86-89.
228 978 P2d at 70-71.
229 443 SE2d at 495. Although this Article has limited its application of social network
theory to tort liability, Ariel Porat has pointed out to me the possibility that the social network
approach may be used to calculate optimal damages as well. If actual damages in privacy suits
result in overdeterrence or underdeterrence, the law might calculate damages based on probabil-
istic analysis instead.
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sistent with social networks theory.-v In Fisher, the trial court properly
concluded that the plaintiff's disclosure of her oedipal thoughts regard-
ing her young son was likely to result in her estranged husband's
learning this salacious information. Maybe the likelihood of disclosure
was 50 percent or maybe it was 15 percent, but armchair social net-
works analysis suggests that no reasonable juror could find a very low
likelihood of disclosure to the husband. The court's decision to pre-
vent the issue from going to the jury was defensible.
In the other cases discussed above, Nader and Duran, the courts
similarly removed from the jury the opportunity to determine that
information that the plaintiff had shared with some people neverthe-
less remained private. For the reasons stated above, although Nader
reached a result that may well have been correct under social net-
works theory, it presented a sufficiently close question to warrant
resolution of the issue by the finder of fact. Jurors could hear evidence
about the facts of the case, as well as expert testimony from sociolo-
gists skilled in social networks theory to help them evaluate the likeli-
hood that the information in question would have been disseminated
widely in the absence of GM's involvement. In Duran, by contrast, it
seems that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the plain-
tiff's use of her name in restaurants would enable someone to connect
her to the Colombian drug cartel, and it would have been appropriate
for the court to hold that the former judge's identity and the threats
against her were private as a matter of law.
There is an alternative approach. Although it should be much
easier for jurors to apply social networks theory in privacy disputes
than economic theory in antitrust cases or cutting-edge scientific prin-
ciples in patent suits, we might still worry that jurors will prefer to rely
on their own intuitions rather than the social science data, distilled
through expert testimony. If this concern becomes paramount, we
might treat "privacy" as a pure question of law, which would allow
trial courts to develop a set of bright-line rules regarding the division
between the public and private realms.
Having said that, one can make a strong case that juries will do
better than judges in cases requiring social networks analysis. Judges
are constrained by precedent and a desire to develop a coherent body
of law, and a desire for good law may make for bad science. As a result
of that, they will sometimes seize upon rules developed in one context
230 In YG., the judge remanded for a jury trial, but Shepardizing the case reveals nothing
about what happened on remand, and the local media stopped covering the story after the appel-
late court published its opinion. See Andre Jackson, "Newsworthy" or No One's Business? 2 in
Fertility Program Sue over TV, Publicity, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1B (July 23, 1990) (reporting
reactions to the appellate court decision).
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and apply them to wholly divergent contexts. The most egregious ex-
ample of this in the limited privacy context is Zieve v Hairston,2' a
Georgia case handed down last year. In Zieve, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia considered a privacy claim brought by a man who had under-
gone hair replacement surgery at his local clinic. Hairston, the appro-
priately-named plaintiff, had agreed to let the clinic use his "before"
and "after" photographs in their television advertisements, so long as
those ads did not air within 500 miles of Georgia. 2 After advertise-
ments featuring Hairston's photograph aired in Georgia and he was
recognized by a coworker, Hairston sued for invasion of privacy. 3 The
Zieve court determined that following Kubach (another Georgia case)
required it to rule for the plaintiff, since Kubach has embraced the
notion of limited privacy.2" But whereas Kubach reached the right re-
sult under social networks theory, Zieve almost certainly did not. After
all, Georgia residents (including Hairston's acquaintances) travel out
of state and watch television while traveling; Hairston presumably had
out-of-state acquaintances who would recognize him in the television
advertisements and communicate with Georgia residents about this
highly noteworthy information ("Hey, our buddy Hairston is on TV.
You'll never guess why!"). The court should have asked how many
out-of-state viewers would have seen the advertisement and explored
the attributes of Hairston's social network. Yet the Zieve court did not
examine any of these social networks questions, instead slavishly ap-
plying Kubach's apparent holding to an easily distinguishable case.
Adherence to precedent, in this instance, caused the court to disregard
235
the inquiries dictated by social science and common sense.
231 266 Ga App 753,598 SE2d 25 (2004).
232 Id at 28-29.
233 The facts of the case suggest breach of contract as an alternative cause of action to the
plaintiff's public disclosure claim. Hairston argued that the defendant had breached its contract
with him. It appears that the trial court granted the defendant a directed verdict on Hairston's
claim that the defendant had breached an oral contract, but submitted the question of whether
the defendant had breached its written contract to the jury. See id at 28. The appellate court did
not consider issues relating to either breach of contract claim on appeal.
234 Id at 30 (finding similarities between Hairston's claims and those in Kubach, including
explicit agreements between the plaintiff and defendant and the fact that the defendant's disclo-
sure "went far beyond the scope of any prior disclosure by plaintiff").
235 Even if juries are primarily responsible for weighing social network theory evidence in
tort cases, judges will remain involved in evaluating the social science through their roles as
evidentiary gatekeepers for expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 148
(1999).
I have found a few other cases in which the courts have stretched the notion of limited pri-
vacy too far, most notably in Veilleux v NBC, Inc, 8 F Supp 2d 23 (D Me 1998), revd in part, vacd
in part, remd for further proceedings, 206 F3d 92 (1st Cir 2000); Green v Chicago Tribune Co, 286
Il App 3d 1, 675 NE2d 249 (1996); and Virgil v Time, Inc, 527 F2d 1122 (9th Cir 1975). In all of
these cases, courts concluded that the subject's willingness to share information with a journalist,
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Indeed, adherence to precedent may be undesirable in the realm
of privacy law, given the rapidity with which new technologies and
new norms can cause expectations of privacy to change. Making "pri-
vacy" an issue of law threatens to ossify obsolete expectations of pri-
vacy that existed in an earlier era."' Of course, for the same reason,
courts considering social networks analysis ought to be wary of relying
on dated social science-a classic study like Schachter and Burdick's
ought to be judged in light of recent developments at girls' schools,
like text-messaging, blogging, and the substantial changes in adoles-
cent culture that have occurred in the intervening years. In light of all
this, we may prefer to have the law of privacy determined by respon-
sive juries that need not worry about creating consistency in the law,
provided the expert testimony at trial informs the jury about how to
apply insights from social networks theory. The world is a complicated
place, and many of the "rules" of social networks theory cannot be
reduced to West headnotes.37
C. Institutional Competence
Some readers undoubtedly will lack confidence in the ability of
courts to resolve the technically difficult social networks analysis
problems that are embedded in privacy tort cases. This concern might
be particularly salient in light of the vexing problems of hindsight bias
that arise in the public disclosure of private facts context. 3'
But let us survey the performance of courts in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of privacy protections in leading cases. The courts in
Sanders and Fisher reached intuitive conclusions that map well onto
the likely results of predictive social networks analysis. The court in
Kubach reached an arguably counterintuitive result that is well sup-
ported by social networks studies of dissemination of the information
on the record, did not indicate a willingness to share the information with the journalist's read-
ers. See Veilleux, 8 F Supp 2d at 40; Green, 675 NE2d at 252-53; Virgil, 527 F2d at 1127. Notably,
Green relied heavily on Virgil, and Veilleux relied on both Virgil and Green. Alabama decisions
relying on Nader and the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Fletcher v Price Chopper Foods of Trumann,
Inc, 220 F3d 871 (8th Cir 2000), made the same mistake, but in the opposite direction, finding
that one's willingness to share previously private information with friends or coworkers neces-
sarily indicated a willingness to share information with the general public. See notes 77, 89.
236 For a report on the results of national polls dealing with privacy matters and how re-
sponses have varied over time, see Katz and Tassone, 54 Pub Op Q at 133 (cited in note 43).
237 Nor can they be translated into bullet points for readers of this Article. To repeat, social
networks analysis is often context-dependent in ways that defy easy characterization or simplis-
tic modeling. The "rules" of social network theory (for example, the strength of weak ties, the
tendency for social networks to be scale-free, the tendency of information to degrade as it passes
through a social network) necessarily operate at a medium to high level of generality.
238 On hindsight bias, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471,1523-31 (1998).
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
at issue there. In Nader and YG., hard cases both, the courts reached
defensible results, though I have suggested that courts might have
asked for additional factual information that should have had some
bearing on the likelihood of subsequent dissemination there. Only in
Duran were the court's intuitions about how information might
spread through society far off the mark, and perhaps hindsight bias is
to blame there.
In assessing this performance, courts appear to do a pretty good
job of intuiting sound answers to what are essentially predictive social
networks analysis problems. But they provide little by way of explana-
tion for these results, other than articulating or rejecting the notion of
limited privacy. Given this background, it may well be that with a bit
more methodological rigor and a few hints about experimental and
empirical results-particularly in those instances where social net-
works studies produce counterintuitive findings--courts can craft
more transparent, and hence more persuasive, opinions in these kinds
of cases.23
Indeed, if courts are able to gauge the risks of information dis-
semination with reasonable accuracy, perhaps ordinary people can
too. ' ° One promising sociological research agenda would try to see
how closely laypeople's guesses about the extent of information dis-
semination track the actual data on information dissemination." If
people learn, through experience, how likely dissemination is to occur,
then this should comfort those worried about the law's decision to
disregard subjective expectations of privacy in torts doctrine and my
239 Slobogin and Schumacher are less positive in their assessment of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as they note several instances in which the Court's reasonable
expectations of privacy differ substantially from survey respondents. Slobogin and Schumacher,
42 Duke L J at 740-42 (cited in note 37). This is interesting, since the Court has eschewed formal
survey data in the Fourth Amendment context, just as the courts have ignored social networks
analysis in the privacy tort setting.
240 Or maybe not. Obvious differences include judges' access to the fruits of the discovery
process and the adversarial system of justice. Judicial detachment may also help them see social
networks more accurately than people who are embedded in them. Indeed, social networks
research suggests that individuals tend to overstate their own importance in a particular social
network and overestimate the degree of connectedness among their own friends. See Kumbasar,
Romney, and Batchelder, 100 Am J of Sociology at 499 (cited in note 116).
241 As best I can tell, however, no one in sociology is pursuing such an agenda. The closest
related research agenda appears to be that of Tiziana Casciaro. Casciaro is studying individuals'
perceptions of the social networks that surround them. She has found that location within a
social network and personality traits such as positive affect alter the accuracy of people's percep-
tions. See Tiziana Casciaro, Kathleen M. Carley, and David Krackhardt, Positive Affectivity and
Accuracy in Social Network Perception, 23 Motivation & Emotion 285, 300-02 (1999); Tiziana
Casciaro, Seeing Things Clearly: Social Structure, Personality, and Accuracy in Social Network
Perception, 20 Soc Networks 331,345-47 (1998).
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advocacy of such an approach.42 Subjective expectations of privacy
and objectively reasonable expectations of privacy could correlate
reasonably well. What little evidence we have on this front shows that
people have a tendency to overestimate their own centrality within
social networks.14 This suggests, in turn, that an individual will have a
tendency to overestimate the extent to which his acquaintances will
find the details of his private life worth discussing. If courts apply an
objective measure of reasonable privacy expectations, they will
probably err on the side of protecting privacy too little, rather than
too much." Judicial errors of the Duran variety will be more common
than judicial errors of the Zieve variety.
We may also expect that helpful feedback mechanisms will de-
velop from courts' occasional use of sociological research in the same
way that economic research is occasionally used at present by courts.
Although I have found a few illuminating studies, the dissemination of
previously private information through social networks has not been a
central concern of sociologists. Yet the privacy context seems like the
most obvious application of this discipline to a field of law. Were
courts to take social networking seriously, one can imagine that soci-
ologists will conduct more studies like the HIV disclosure and bakery
rumor studies, each of which teaches a great deal about the dissemina-
tion of previously private information through particular social net-
works.
D. Extensions of the Approach
The issue of reasonable expectations of privacy or confidentiality
cuts through many different substantive fields of law, including Fourth
Amendment law, . the constitutional right of information privacy,M
242 We do know that people differ in their ability to accurately map the information flow
through their own social networks. See Bondonio, 20 Soc Networks at 325-26 (cited in note 100);
Casciaro, Carley, and Krackhardt, 23 Motivation & Emotion at 292 (cited in note 241). We might
suppose on the basis of this data that people's ability to intuit social networks theory insights
varies as well. For a general discussion of the gap between individuals' perceptions and realities
in the context of social networks, see David Krackhardt, Cognitive Social Structures, 9 Soc Net-
works 109 (1987).
243 See Kumbasar, Romney, and Batchelder, 100 Am J Sociology at 499 (cited in note 116).
244 By "too little" I mean, relative to the parties' actual subjective expectations of privacy.
245 See, for example, Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735,743-44 (1979) ("This Court consistently
has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties."); United States v Miller, 425 US 435,443 (1976):
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
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Freedom of Information Act privacy, 7 various evidentiary privileges,'
patents,249 and trade secret law.2° In this Article, I have for the most
part confined my analysis to the privacy torts context. There are a
couple of reasons for this. First, the notion of limited privacy has
found receptive audiences in the torts cases, and so incorporating
ideas from social networks theory into the law would not require
wholesale revision of the tort laws in many states. Second, and relat-
edly, a notion of limited privacy might be more normatively appealing
Contrast Burrows v Superior Court, 13 Cal 3d 238, 118 Cal Rptr 166, 170-71 (1974) (embracing a
notion of limited privacy, with respect to bank records, under the California Constitution).
Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27 (2001), seems somewhat receptive to the probabilistic ap-
proach that I have advocated herein. In Kyllo the Court held that using sense-enhancing tech-
nology to obtain information about the interior of a home is a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes, "at least where ... the technology in question is not in general public use." Id at 34.
This "general public use" language suggests that, to some degree, obscurity is privacy, and people
have a reasonable expectation of privacy against facts that an individual might conceivably, but
probably won't, discover about them.
246 See generally Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589,598-604 (1977) (concluding that the disclosure
of information to New York government officials about prescription medication use did not
violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to information privacy, since such information was
already routinely shared with health care providers and insurance industry employees); Doe v
Borough of Barrington, 729 F Supp 376, 382-85 (D NJ 1990) (recognizing a constitutional right
of information privacy claim where an individual disclosed his HIV status to police officers in
order to prevent them from coming into contact with his open skin sores, and the officers later
disclosed the man's HIV status to his neighbors).
247 See, for example, United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press, 489 US 749, 780 (1989) (finding that an FBI rap sheet was private within the
meaning of the Freedom of Information Act's privacy exception).
248 See, for example, United States v Evans, 113 F3d 1457, 1462 (7th Cir 1997). The attorney-
client privilege is defined by a client's reasonable expectation of privacy and extends only to
communications by a client to an attorney that were intended to be confidential:
Thus as a general matter, the attorney-client privilege will not shield from disclosure state-
ments made by a client to his or her attorney in the presence of a third party who is not an
agent of either the client or attorney.... [T]he presence of [ ] a third party defeats the privi-
lege even though the client may harbor a desire for confidentiality because the privilege
"goes no further than is necessary to secure the client's subjective freedom of consultation."
Id (internal citations omitted).
249 See, for example, WL. Gore & Associates, Inc v Garlock, Inc, 721 F2d 1540, 1548-49 (Fed
Cir 1983) (defining "secret" prior use); Rosaire v Baroid Sales Division, National Lead Co, 218
F2d 72 (5th Cir 1955) (holding that, because an invention is unpatentable if it was used by others
before the patentee's invention, a prior, though obscure, use of appellant's invention deprived it
of patentability).
250 See, for example, Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc v DEV Industries, Inc, 925 F2d 174, 177,
180 (7th Cir 1991) (holding that while the plaintiff "could have done more" to protect the confi-
dentiality of its trade secrets, "perfect security is not optimum security," and so the plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial on misappropriation of trade secrets despite having shared the secret with
numerous vendors); Wilkes v Pioneer American Insurance Co, 383 F Supp 1135, 1141 (D SC
1974) (holding that absolute secrecy is not required in order for a trade secret to be protected,
but a "substantial element of secrecy must exist").
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in the tort context than in some other contexts."' That said, there may
be substantial benefits from unifying these divergent bodies of privacy
law, and, in the event that the current Article persuades some of its
readers, future work will explore applications of networks theory to
some or all of these fields.
Beyond the potential for insights about these substantive fields,
the study of social networks opens up enormous possibilities for those
who fancy themselves scholars of the law and social norms. First-
generation social norms scholarship suggested that gossip networks
could be highly effective in facilitating informal social control, as an
alternative to formal law. 2 In recent years, the social norms literature
may have lost a little bit of momentum. One way for legal scholars to
recover that momentum is to study gossip networks in more rigorous
ways, so that we can evaluate when informal social control might func-
tion as a welfare-enhancing alternative to legal process.
This idea has many potential applications, but two examples here
will be illustrative. If we learn that gossip networks in the landlord-
tenant context are highly efficient, the law ought to be more receptive
to landlord self-help." Similarly, inefficiencies in the social networks
of lawyers and legal clients may explain the need for judges to impose
Rule 11 sanctions against litigators who misbehave. Understanding
the relevant social networks helps us evaluate the need for legal
regulation of private actors. Social network theory, in short, may lay
the foundation for a second generation of interesting social norms
scholarship.
251 A criminal defendant might say that he was perfectly willing to share information about
a criminal conspiracy with his co-conspirators, but had a reasonable expectation that the infor-
mation would not be disseminated outside the group of co-conspirators. When the communica-
tion at issue concerns violations of criminal laws, there may be strong justifications for holding
that lessened expectations of privacy attach or deeming such expectations altogether irrelevant.
Compare discussion of Fisher in text accompanying note 227.
252 See note 22 and accompanying text.
253 The idea here is that landlords who lock out tenants improperly will be sanctioned by
the marketplace if gossip functions well. Would-be tenants would pay a premium to rent from
landlords who have a reputation for behaving reasonably. If, on the other hand, tenant gossip
networks function poorly, then the fear of a market sanction may inadequately deter landlords
from engaging in opportunistic or illegal behavior. For recent efforts to enhance the efficiency of
the tenant gossip network, see http://www.apartmentratings com (visited May 16, 2005) and
http://apartmentreviews.net (visited May 16, 2005). For more on landlord self-help, see Berg v
Wiley, 264 NW2d 145 (Minn 1978).
254 With a perfectly efficient social network, judicial scoldings of attorneys in open court,
combined with observations of misconduct by opposing counsel, would deter adequately those
attorneys who hoped to win clients in the future.
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CONCLUSION
Privacy torts doctrine directs judges to evaluate whether it was
appropriate for a plaintiff to assume that her initial disclosure of in-
formation about herself would result in the widespread dissemination
of that information. As most courts understand this test, it calls for
seemingly difficult, generally counterfactual, ex ante analysis that so-
ciologists are better equipped to perform. In light of all this, it is per-
haps surprising that courts seem to reach defensible results in many of
the leading privacy cases. Their analysis leaves something to be de-
sired, and I have tried to show that insights from social networks the-
ory can improve that analysis. The substantial recent improvements in
the quality of this body of social science, mediated through expert tes-
timony, ought to find their way into American courtrooms.
This Article attempts to furnish courts with a theory of privacy
that they can embrace readily, taking as a given the choice of these
courts to base the privacy determination on what the parties should
have expected to follow the initial disclosure of information by some-
one other than the defendant. Where a defendant's disclosure materi-
ally alters the flow of otherwise obscure information through a social
network, such that what would have otherwise remained obscure be-
comes widely known, the defendant should be liable for public disclo-
sure of private facts. By the same token, when a court must determine
whether a defendant has intruded upon the plaintiffs seclusion by
improperly gathering information about the plaintiff's private matters
or affairs, judges ought to ask whether the plaintiff's information was
likely to have remained obscure had the defendant never acted. For
both these torts, social networks theory holds out the promise of re-
placing the common law's vagueness with a relatively objective, test-
able, rigorous, and principled approach.
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